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INTRODUCTION 
Chief Justice Earl Warren famously stated in Trop v. Dulles that the 
scope of the Eighth Amendment was “not static” and that it “must draw its 
meaning from the evolving standards of decency that mark the progress of 
a maturing society.”1 This statement characterized not just the Warren 
Court’s approach to the Eighth Amendment, but reflected a model of 
living constitutionalism based on the idea of progress. The progress 
 
 
  David Aram Kaiser, J.D., who received his law degree from the University of California, 
Hastings College of the Law, and a Ph.D. in English from the University of California at Berkeley, is a 
judicial staff attorney at the Supreme Court of California. He is also currently a senior research fellow 
with the California Constitution Center at the University of California, Berkeley School of Law. The 
views expressed herein are solely those of the author. This Article does not purport to reflect the views 
of the Supreme Court of California as a whole or any of its justices, and is based entirely on 
information available to the public. I am grateful for the insightful feedback of Jim Wilkinson, Darien 
Shanske, and Reuel Schiller at various points of this project. Any errors, of course, remain my own. 
 1. 356 U.S. 86, 101 (1958). 
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associated with the Warren Court involved the expansion of the role of the 
federal government in a variety of areas—the regulatory state, civil rights, 
voter reapportionment, and criminal procedure—in such a way as to 
safeguard the individual citizen through collective action.
2
 The Warren 
Court regarded the liberty protected by the Constitution as vindicated by 
an active government—what United States Supreme Court Justice Stephen 
Breyer has later called “active liberty.”3 But following its apogee in the 
Warren Court years, the idea of constitutional progress by means of the 
modern state has fallen on hard times, both specifically within 
constitutional jurisprudence (because of the increasing dominance of 
originalism), and within academic discourse generally (because of the 
ascendance of theories of postmodernism). Tellingly, in a recent dissent to 
an Eighth Amendment case, Miller v. Alabama, Justice Alito stated that 
“[b]oth the provenance and philosophical basis” of Trop were 
“problematic from the start.”4 His dissent questions: “Is it true that our 
society is inexorably evolving in the direction of greater and greater 
decency? Who says so, and how did this particular philosophy of history 
find its way into our fundamental law?”5 In his influential book on 
originalism, A Matter of Interpretation, Justice Scalia expressed a similar 
criticism of Trop, but in more colorful and provocative terms, stating that 
“[a] society that adopts a bill of rights is skeptical that ‘evolving standards 
of decency’ always ‘mark progress,’ and that societies always ‘mature,’ as 
opposed to rot.”6 Justice Scalia thus implies that constitutional change may 
not always be beneficial and indeed that a living constitution might rather 
be seen as a rotting constitution. 
This Article examines how the idea of constitutional progress, Trop’s 
“particular philosophy of history,” is currently attacked by conservative 
proponents of constitutional originalism and neglected by contemporary 
proponents of living constitutionalism. Traditionally, proponents of living 
constitutionalism supported modern constitutional doctrine through this 
 
 
 2. ALEXANDER M. BICKEL, THE SUPREME COURT AND THE IDEA OF PROGRESS (1970). For an 
astute contemporary analysis of the importance of the Warren Court decisions to modern constitutional 
doctrine, see AKHIL REED AMAR, AMERICA’S UNWRITTEN CONSTITUTION: THE PRECEDENTS AND 
PRINCIPLES WE LIVE BY 139–99 (2012) [hereinafter AMAR, UNWRITTEN CONSTITUTION]. 
 3. STEPHEN BREYER, ACTIVE LIBERTY: INTERPRETING OUR DEMOCRATIC CONSTITUTION 
(2005). 
 4. Miller v. Alabama, 132 S. Ct. 2455, 2487 (2012) (Alito, J., dissenting). Miller holds that the 
mandatory sentencing of juveniles to life in prison without the possibility of parole violates the Eighth 
Amendment. Id. at 2460. 
 5. Id. at 2487. 
 6. ANTONIN SCALIA, A MATTER OF INTERPRETATION: FEDERAL COURTS AND THE LAW 40–41 
(1997) [hereinafter SCALIA, MATTER OF INTERPRETATION]. 
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philosophy of history—a narrative of progress in which constitutional 
principles are seen as developing towards a modern form of organized 
liberty and individual freedom. Progress in this sense is now practically a 
dirty word in postmodern academic circles. Originalism, which focuses on 
the meaning of the Constitution, or of a constitutional amendment, at the 
moment of its historical origin, is increasingly becoming the dominant 
historical model in constitutional interpretation.
7
 Numerous commentators 
have criticized originalism for relying on “law office history.” But, as this 
Article argues, the central problem posed by the increasing dominance of 
originalism is not that it turns constitutional interpretation towards history 
per se, but that originalism expresses a model of history divorced from the 
idea of progress. The advantage of an appropriate philosophy of history to 
a progressive interpretation of the Constitution is that it reunites historical 
change with an account of constitutional principles. One strength of the 
traditional account of the common law was that it expressed developing 
principles of reason.
8
 Contemporary accounts of common law 
constitutionalism have sought to divest themselves from such apparent 
metaphysical baggage.
9
 However, by divesting common law 
constitutionalism from any connection to a philosophy of history and 
reason, contemporary accounts of living constitutionalism are failing to 
meet originalism as a strong theory of constitutional interpretation.
10
 As I 
will argue, proponents of living constitutionalism need to reclaim some 
version of a philosophy of history in order to rebut Justice Scalia’s 
challenge that living constitutionalism represents “rot” rather than 
progress. 
The Article is structured as follows. Part I provides an overview of the 
issue of progress and the Constitution. Parts II and III contrast the 
jurisprudence of the two current United States Supreme Court Justices 
who have written influential books on constitutional theory: Justice Scalia 
and Justice Breyer. Part II describes Justice Scalia’s account of originalism 
 
 
 7. The capstone originalist Supreme Court decision is District of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 
570 (2008). See Reva B. Siegel, Heller & Originalism’s Dead Hand—In Theory and Practice, 56 
UCLA L. REV. 1399, 1423 (2009) [hereinafter Siegel, Originalism’s Dead Hand]. For an analytical 
survey of theories of originalism, see Mitchell N. Berman, Originalism Is Bunk, 84 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1 
(2009). 
 8. See infra Part IV. 
 9. See infra Part V. 
 10. Laurence Tribe has recently raised this important issue, suggesting that liberals should go 
beyond the embrace of incremental change that marks contemporary common law constitutionalism 
and, instead, define a narrative that connects the constitutional past to the present based on “principles 
by which we feel bound” and “which themselves evolve with our changing selves.” Laurence H. Tribe, 
America’s Constitutional Narrative, 141 DAEDALUS 18, 24 (2012). 
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in relation to a philosophy of history. Because Scalia posits original 
constitutional principles established at the founding and good for all time, 
he rejects any narrative of progress for the Constitution. Part III juxtaposes 
Scalia’s originalism with Justice Breyer’s account of “active liberty,” 
which is based on Benjamin Constant’s contrast between the liberty of the 
moderns and the liberty of the ancients. Parts IV, V, and VI discuss the 
idea of a narrative of progress in relation to some of the most influential 
contemporary theorists of living constitutionalism: Ronald Dworkin, 
Bruce Ackerman, Jack Balkin, David Strauss, and Reva Siegel. Part VII 
looks at a specific example of a constitutional right—the right of indigent 
criminal defendants to be provided counsel—in light of the narrative of 
progress developed in the previous sections. Part VIII presents concluding 
thoughts. 
I. PROGRESS AND THE CONSTITUTION 
The issue of progress and the Constitution raises the jurisprudential 
question of whether and how certain conceptions of liberty are embodied 
in the Constitution. The Lochner era Supreme Court regarded the 
individual’s freedom to contract as a liberty embodied in the Constitution. 
That view was famously rejected by Justice Holmes in his dissent to 
Lochner v. New York, in which he wrote, “[t]he Fourteenth Amendment 
does not enact Mr. Herbert Spencer’s Social Statics.”11 But conservative 
critics of the New Deal and the Warren court can make an analogous 
argument, contending that neither does the Fourteenth Amendment enact 
the modern regulatory and welfare state. Liberals and conservatives 
therefore fundamentally disagree about the type of liberty protected by the 
Constitution.  
As I will discuss below, in terms of the philosophical debate over 
concepts of liberty, the individual liberty associated with the Lochner-era 
court can be correlated to a “negative” conception of liberty in relation to 
the state, and the collectivist liberty associated with the New Deal and the 
modern welfare state can be correlated with a “positive” conception of 
liberty in relation to the state. The “negative” conception of liberty is the 
right to be left alone by the state, while the “positive” conception of liberty 
is the right to be affirmatively aided by the state.
12
 The historian can trace 
a change in the dominant doctrine of liberty from the eighteenth century, 
with its emphasis on negative liberty and laissez faire conceptions of the 
 
 
 11. Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45, 75 (1905). 
 12. See infra Part III. 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_jurisprudence/vol6/iss2/2
  
 
 
 
 
2014] PUTTING PROGRESS BACK INTO PROGRESSIVE 261 
 
 
 
 
state, to the twentieth century, with its emphasis on positive liberty and the 
role of the welfare state. The historian can trace the corresponding growth 
of the federal government and the regulatory state as embodying this 
model of positive liberty.  
But what is the relationship between the story of the modern state and 
the story of the development of modern constitutional doctrine? Does the 
Constitution have its own autonomy as law, or is it merely a reflection of 
the dominant political culture of the time? These are no longer historical 
questions. These are questions of constitutional theory and are ones, this 
Article argues, that a theory of constitutional progress is uniquely able to 
address. 
As Alexander Bickel has described, the Warren Court fused an idea of 
progress with modern constitutional doctrine.
13
 However, the theme of 
progress and the Constitution goes back much further in American history. 
Progress has been a key term in jurisprudence and political philosophy, 
and thinkers across the political spectrum have appealed to it in various 
forms. For example, the social Darwinism of Herbert Spencer, which 
influenced the Lochner-era Supreme Court, incorporated progress in the 
form of a “confidence that the progress of society inhered in the nature of 
things . . . .”14 Spencer’s social Darwinism, however, was combined with a 
“terrible pessimism about man’s capacity to move purposefully in the right 
direction . . . .”15 Progress in the liberal progressive tradition reflects the 
inverse view, namely that human beings can purposefully use the 
apparatus of the state to achieve progress. Bickel thus describes the idea of 
progress behind the Warren Court: “men . . . acquired confidence in their 
own capacity to change their environment and institutional arrangements 
for the better.”16 This idea of improving political institutions based on 
human reason ultimately reflects the tradition of the French Revolution. 
Edmund Burke inaugurated a central strand of modern conservative 
thought by questioning this animating goal of the French Revolution—the 
use of reason and the apparatus of the state to achieve progress.
17
 
 
 
 13. BICKEL, supra note 2. 
 14. Id. at 16. 
 15. Id. (internal citation omitted). 
 16. Id. at 19.  
 17. DAVID ARAM KAISER, ROMANTICISM, AESTHETICS, AND NATIONALISM 61–68 (1999) 
[hereinafter KAISER, NATIONALISM]; David Aram Kaiser, “The Perfection of Reason”: Coleridge and 
the Ancient Constitution, 32 STUDS. IN ROMANTICISM 29, 29–45 (1993) [hereinafter Kaiser, Perfection 
of Reason]. For a contemporary conservative intellectual account of the Burkean tradition, see YUVAL 
LEVIN, THE GREAT DEBATE: EDMUND BURKE, THOMAS PAINE, AND THE BIRTH OF RIGHT AND LEFT 
(2013). 
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After the Warren Court, however, the idea of progress has largely 
disappeared from the jurisprudence of both the Left and the Right. The 
disappearance of the idea of progress from the jurisprudence of the Right 
is not surprising, since mainstream conservative thought, influenced by 
Burke, has always been skeptical about appeals to progress through the 
state. What is surprising, however, is how the idea of progress has been 
rejected by its former home, the cultural Left. Postmodernist thought 
criticized the “grand narratives” of history, including the liberal narrative 
of progress through the development of the state reflected in the Warren 
Court.
18
 Many critics on the Left inspired by postmodernism have decried 
the idea of progress in history, finding it, at best, hopelessly naïve, or, at 
worst, irredeemably complicit with Western Imperialism.
19
 Meanwhile, in 
conservative jurisprudence, originalism has dominated, and has been 
regarded as initiating the turn (or return) to history in contemporary 
constitutional theory. 
II. ORIGINALISM: PRINCIPLES WITHOUT CHANGE, HISTORY WITHOUT 
PROGRESS 
A centrant tenet of Justice Scalia’s theory of originalism, as he states it 
in Originalism: The Lesser Evil, is that the very purpose of having a 
written Constitution is to prevent change: “The purpose of constitutional 
guarantees—and in particular those constitutional guarantees of individual 
rights that are at the center of this controversy—is precisely to prevent the 
law from reflecting certain changes in original values that the society 
adopting the Constitution thinks fundamentally undesirable.”20 He repeats 
and amplifies this point in A Matter of Interpretation in the context of 
rejecting a common law approach to constitutional interpretation.
21
 Scalia 
defines a common law approach to adjudication as one that is not 
 
 
 18. See JEAN-FRANÇOIS LYOTARD, THE POSTMODERN CONDITION: A REPORT ON KNOWLEDGE 
(Geoff Bennington & Brian Massumi trans., 1979). Richard Rorty is perhaps unique on the Left in 
combining a post-philosophical critique of the grand narratives of progress with a vigorous defense of 
the traditional goals of the modern liberal state. See RICHARD RORTY, TRUTH AND PROGRESS: 
PHILOSOPHICAL PAPERS (1998); RICHARD RORTY, ACHIEVING OUR COUNTRY: LEFTIST THOUGHT IN 
TWENTIETH-CENTURY AMERICA (1998) [hereinafter RORTY, ACHIEVING OUR COUNTRY]. 
 19. For example, Eric Foner’s review of 2 BRUCE ACKERMAN, WE THE PEOPLE: 
TRANSFORMATIONS (1998), states, “[a]mong the most charming features of Ackerman’s approach is 
that he really believes in that quaint idea, Progress.” Eric Foner, The Strange Career of the 
Reconstruction Amendments, 108 YALE L.J. 2003, 2009 (1999). For a discussion of the American 
progressive tradition and imperialism, see JACKSON LEARS, REBIRTH OF A NATION: THE MAKING OF 
MODERN AMERICA 276–326 (2009). 
 20. Antonin Scalia, Originalism: The Lesser Evil, 57 U. CIN. L. REV. 849, 862 (1989). 
 21. ANTONIN SCALIA, MATTER OF INTERPRETATION, supra note 6, at 3–14. 
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constrained by the text of a constitution or a statute. This is an accurate 
enough description of the English common law, which traditionally was 
contrasted with written legal codes.
22
 But Scalia goes further and describes 
common law judging as if it were unconstrained by any sense of legal 
principles. This, as I discuss below, is not an accurate account of the 
common law tradition.
23
 Scalia does acknowledge that the common law 
tradition understood itself to be discovering existing law rather than 
creating new law, but he argues that the work of legal realist scholarship 
in the twentieth century has shown that common law judges were in fact 
creating new law.
24
 Scalia’s embrace of a stark legal realist view of the 
common law as unconstrained by principles is ironic because such a legal 
realist view would also reject Scalia’s originalist claim that constitutional 
interpretation can be based on principles embodied in the constitutional 
text.
25
 
Scalia thus defines common law judging as an infinitely malleable 
practice. As he describes the common law tradition, no rule of decision 
previously announced could be erased, but a common law judge could 
create new law by distinguishing the facts of the current case and 
enunciating a new principle of law based on those new facts.
26
 Because the 
facts of cases are seldom exactly similar, common law judging, Scalia 
contends, provides no practical restraint on the ability of the judge to 
create new law through distinguishing prior cases.
27
 Scalia argues that, 
whatever virtue common law judging might have in some areas of the law, 
it is inappropriate and pernicious to apply this approach to constitutional 
interpretation because this approach allows the judge to ignore and 
override the principles expressed in the Constitution. It is therefore within 
this context of his opposition to common law constitutional interpretation 
that Scalia defines the essential value of a written Constitution as 
preserving original principles against change: “[i]t certainly cannot be said 
that a constitution naturally suggests changeability; to the contrary, its 
whole purpose is to prevent change—to embed certain rights in such a 
manner that future generations cannot readily take them away.”28  
 
 
 22. See Kaiser, Perfection of Reason, supra note 17, at 37–40. 
 23. See infra Part IV. 
 24. SCALIA, MATTER OF INTERPRETATION, supra note 6, at 10. 
 25. Indeed, as discussed below in Section Five, David Strauss’s account of common law 
constitutionalism, which is the theoretical opposite of Scalia’s view, expresses the same stark legal 
realism. 
 26. SCALIA, MATTER OF INTERPRETATION, supra note 6, at 8–9. 
 27. See id. at 7–11.  
 28. Id. at 40. 
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Justice Scalia focuses his argument against constitutional changeability 
by turning to the Eighth Amendment prohibition on cruel and unusual 
punishment. The Eighth Amendment has often been considered the 
exemplary constitutional provision for living constitutionalism since Chief 
Justice Earl Warren famously stated in Trop v. Dulles that this 
amendment’s meaning has changed to reflect “the evolving standards of 
decency that mark the progress of a maturing society.”29 Scalia rejects the 
whole model of progress presupposed by this. Rather, he states, “[a] 
society that adopts a bill of rights is skeptical that ‘evolving standards of 
decency’ always ‘mark progress,’ and that societies always ‘mature,’ as 
opposed to rot.”30 Scalia argues that if one released the phrase “cruel and 
unusual” from its historical meaning, then the Eighth Amendment “would 
be no protection against the moral perceptions of a future, more brutal, 
generation.”31 The principle of the Eighth Amendment, he argues, is 
“rooted in the moral perceptions of the time.”32 As Scalia concludes: 
“[M]oral principles” . . . are permanent. The Americans of 1791 
surely thought that what was cruel was cruel, regardless of what a 
more brutal future generation might think about it. They were 
embedding in the Bill of Rights their moral values, for otherwise all 
its general and abstract guarantees could be brought to nought.
33
 
Scalia’s argument is that the original meaning of the Eighth Amendment 
serves to prevent a possible increase in barbarism. An increase in 
barbarism, however, has never been the expectation of a liberal philosophy 
of history. A liberal philosophy of history expects that moral progress will 
increase. To the defender of living constitutionalism, therefore, the central 
problem with Scalia’s originalism is not his appeal to history as such, but 
rather his rejection of the narrative of progress in history. Scalia’s 
originalism removes constitutional principles from the movement of 
history. For Scalia, the whole point of a written Constitution is to prevent 
change. For Scalia, constitutional principles are understood as being fully 
expressed at their founding and are thereafter timeless. 
Liberal and progressive critics of Scalia’s originalism fail to focus on 
his antipathy towards progress and a progressive movement of history, 
 
 
 29. 356 U.S. 86, 101 (1958). On the importance of the Eighth Amendment to living 
constitutionalism, see William C. Heffernan, Constitutional Historicism: An Examination of the Eighth 
Amendment Evolving Standards Of Decency Test, 54 AM. U. L. REV. 1355 (2005). 
 30. SCALIA, MATTER OF INTERPRETATION, supra note 6, at 40–41. 
 31. Id. at 145. 
 32. Id. 
 33. Id. at 146. 
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because, I believe, they themselves have an ambivalent relationship with 
the concept of progress. But the unwillingness of liberal and progressive 
constitutional theorists to defend progress as the traditional core of living 
constitutionalism cedes too much theoretical ground to originalism. Once 
one abandons the defense of the narrative of progress, constitutional 
change is subject to being recharacterized as the story of a falling away 
from original principles. In the conservative narrative, this represents a 
story of constitutional decline, or, as Scalia phrases it, “rot.”34 
Inevitably, of course, new phenomena and new circumstances emerge 
in history as problems with which constitutional interpretation must 
contend. Critics of originalism often argue as if the inevitable emergence 
of new circumstances is, in itself, sufficient to refute originalism as a 
theory of constitutional interpretation. After all, the critic may ask, the 
Founders never foresaw the Internet when they were drafting the 
Constitution, so how can originalism guide constitutional questions 
relating to this new historical phenomenon? Scalia, however, readily 
acknowledges that the history of the United States since the founding has 
presented circumstances and phenomena unknown and unforeseen by the 
founders, to which the court must apply constitutional principles. He 
maintains that the principles, as principles, do not change, even as they are 
applied to new factual circumstances unforeseen by the Founders. New 
technology, as such, is not troubling to originalism as long as the new 
circumstances can be subsumed under concepts and principles available at 
the founding.
35
 For example, Scalia has no trouble dealing with infrared 
searches as a Fourth Amendment issue.
36
 This search technology was 
unknown to the Founders, but the concept of a government search was 
known to them, and therefore this new type of search poses no 
fundamental problem to originalist interpretation.
37
 
In this Article, however, I want to engage in broader theoretcal terms 
how historical change is a problem for originalism. My argument is that 
the important conflict between originalism and living constitutionalism 
 
 
 34. Id. at 41. 
 35. This idea is reflected in his corresponding account of textualism: “In their full context, words 
mean what they conveyed to reasonable people at the time they were written—with the understanding 
that general terms may embrace later technological innovations.” ANTONIN SCALIA & BRYAN A. 
GARNER, READING LAW: THE INTERPRETATION OF LEGAL TEXTS 16 (2012). 
 36. See Kyllo v. United States, 533 U.S. 27 (2001). 
 37. See United States v. Jones, 132 S. Ct. 945, 950 n.3 (2012). “Whatever new methods of 
investigation may be devised, our task, at a minimum, is to decide whether the action in question 
would have constituted a ‘search’ within the original meaning of the Fourth Amendment.” Id. 
(emphasis added). 
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occurs at a more fundamental level than the particular problems of 
applying the Constitution to new technologies. The conflict between 
originalism and living constitutionalism is rooted in issues relating to the 
very development of the modern state itself, a development that both 
entails a new role for government and a new concept of liberty for the 
citizen in relation to that government. As I will discuss below, the story of 
the development of the modern state is reflected in constitutional theory in 
the debate over “positive” and “negative” accounts of liberty, that is, 
between the view that the essence of individual freedom consists in being 
left alone by the state and the view that the state is central to creating the 
conditions under which the individual can achieve freedom. As I will 
discuss next, Justice Breyer’s account of “active liberty” (in his book by 
the same name) emerges from the debate concerning these two opposing 
accounts of liberty. An analysis of Breyer’s work will therefore show how 
the liberal narrative of progress remains important to contemporary 
constitutional theory. 
III. STEPHEN BREYER’S “ACTIVE LIBERTY” AND THE MODERN STATE 
Justice Stephen Breyer’s book-length essay, Active Liberty, has been 
seen as the liberal-wing’s answer to Scalia’s A Matter of Interpretation.38 
Commentators have mainly focused on Breyer’s direct criticisms of 
originalism.
39
 However, as I will argue below, what is more important for 
a progressive response to originalism is an analysis of the implications of 
the philosophy of history under which Breyer advances his concept of 
active liberty. 
Breyer uses a framework that contrasts the liberty of the ancients and 
the liberty of the moderns, a contrast famously made by the French-Swiss 
political philosopher Benjamin Constant in 1819. As Breyer explains, 
Constant’s liberty of the moderns is “the individual’s freedom to pursue 
his own interests and desires free of improper government interference.”40 
In contrast, “the liberty of the ancients” is “an active liberty,” which 
“[f]rom the citizen’s perspective” means “an active and constant 
participation in collective powers . . . .”41  
 
 
 38. BREYER, supra note 3. For review essays on this theme, see Michael W. McConnell, Active 
Liberty: A Progressive Alternative to Textualism and Originalism?, 119 HARV. L. REV. 2387 (2006); 
James E. Ryan, Does It Take a Theory? Originalism, Active Liberty, and Minimalism, 58 STAN. L. 
REV. 1623 (2006). 
 39. See McConnell, supra note 38, at 2414; Ryan, supra note 38, at 1635. 
 40. BREYER, supra note 3, at 5 (internal citations omitted). 
 41. Id. at 4. 
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Further fleshing out his conceptual framework, Breyer states that active 
liberty “bears some similarities to . . . Isaiah Berlin’s concept of ‘positive 
liberty.’”42 The English political philosopher Isaiah Berlin distinguished 
between two concepts of liberty, negative and positive.
43
 Berlin’s essay 
follows a long tradition in liberal thought, which contemporary political 
philosopher Alan Wolfe has summarized as follows: negative liberty is the 
view that “freedom consists in the fact that no one can tell me what to do,” 
whereas positive liberty is the view that “it is not sufficient for me merely 
to be left alone, I must also have the capacity to realize the goals that I 
choose for myself.”44 Scalia’s A Matter of Interpretation reflects a 
conception of rights as “negative” liberties, that is, as restraints against the 
state’s encroachment on the freedom of the individual. An emphasis on 
negative liberties characterizes “classical” liberalism, laissez-faire 
economics, and a limited role for the state.
45
 “Modern” liberalism on the 
other hand recognizes a “positive” conception of liberty, and conceives a 
state that intervenes in the economy to provide opportunities for individual 
development.
46
 
Breyer’s account of active liberty is consistent with the role that 
modern liberalism has envisioned for the modern welfare state. Indeed, 
many of the Supreme Court cases that Breyer lists as embodying “active 
liberty” are classics of New Deal jurisprudence.47 But even though Breyer 
connects active liberty with the modern welfare and regulatory state, 
Breyer, in an apparently unintentional irony, bases his theoretical 
 
 
 42. Id. at 137 n.6. 
 43. ISAIAH BERLIN, Two Concepts of Liberty, in FOUR ESSAYS ON LIBERTY (1969). 
 44. ALAN WOLFE, THE FUTURE OF LIBERALISM 13 (2009). The Hegelian philosopher of 
liberalism, Guido de Ruggiero, presents a similar account in GUIDO DE RUGGIERO, THE HISTORY OF 
EUROPEAN LIBERALISM 350–57 (R. G. Collingwood trans., Beacon Press 1964) (1925).  
 45. WOLFE, supra note 44, at 13. De Ruggiero similarly states:  
History presents us with two conceptions, one inspiring the political systems of the eighteenth 
century, the other those of the nineteenth and twentieth. According to the first, freedom is the 
ability to do what one likes, a liberty of choice implying the individual’s right not to be 
hampered by others in the development of his own activity. 
DE RUGGIERO, supra note 44, at 350. 
 46. “[M]odern liberals are prepared to accept state intervention into the economy in order to give 
large numbers of people the sense of mastery that free market capitalism gives only to the few.” 
WOLFE, supra note 44, at 13. 
 47. Breyer lists Wickard v. Filburn, 317 U.S. 111, 125 (1942); NLRB v. Jones & Laughlin Steel 
Corp., 301 U.S. 1 (1937); and W. Coast Hotel Co. v. Parrish, 300 U.S. 379 (1937). BREYER, supra 
note 3, at 138 n.10. He also lists three central voter reapportionment cases from the 1960s: Reynolds v. 
Sims, 377 U.S. 533 (1964); Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186 (1962); and Gomillion v. Lightfoot, 364 U.S. 
339 (1960). BREYER, supra note 3, at 138 n.10. For a discussion of the key transformational cases of 
the New Deal, including Wickard, see 2 BRUCE ACKERMAN, WE THE PEOPLE: TRANSFORMATIONS 
368–75 (1998). 
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justification of active liberty on Constant’s liberty of the ancients. To fully 
appreciate the significance of this unintentional irony for contemporary 
living constitutionalism, we need to turn to the philosophy of history that 
Constant presents in distinguishing between the liberty of the ancients and 
the liberty of the moderns. 
Constant, writing in 1819, identifies the development of modern 
commerce as creating a distinctly modern liberty, which he distinguishes 
from the liberty of the ancients. Constant associates the liberty of the 
ancients with the collective communities of the Greeks and Romans. He 
sees the development of international commerce as inaugurating a great 
historical shift between the ancient and modern world. Constant argues 
that the increased flow of commerce in modern times gives rise to the 
quintessentially modern liberty of individuals freely pursuing their private 
interests within the modern free market.
48
 This new economic model 
called for the protection of universal individual rights of contract and 
property against the arbitrary restraints of traditional feudal privileges 
associated with the ancient regime.
49
 While Constant does acknowledge 
some sort of collective role for government, he regards the historical 
developments of modernity as destroying the tightly knit communities 
within which the liberty of the ancients existed.
50
 His emphasis therefore is 
on the development of the modern private individual, whose 
corresponding modern liberty is freedom from restraint by the state.
51
  
We can contrast Constant’s conception with Hegel’s account of the 
modern state in the Philosophy of Right (1821).
52
 Hegel points to a 
distinctive development of the modern world, the differentiation between 
the civil society and the state. Civil society is the mass of individuals 
involved in economic activity, each seeking his or her good.
53
 Civil 
society embodies the so-called “free market” famously described by Adam 
Smith in 1776 in The Wealth of Nations.
54
 According to this conception of 
 
 
 48. “[C]ommerce inspires in men a vivid love of individual independence. Commerce supplies 
their needs, satisfies their desires, without the intervention of the authorities.” Id. at 315. 
 49. WOLFE, supra note 44, at 14. 
 50. “[W]e can no longer enjoy the liberty of the ancients, which consisted in an active and 
constant participation in collective power. Our freedom must consist of peaceful enjoyment and 
private independence.” BENJAMIN CONSTANT, The Liberty of the Ancients Compared with That of the 
Moderns, in POLITICAL WRITINGS 316 (Biancamaria Fontana ed. & trans., 1988). 
 51. This is how Berlin viewed the work of Constant. For example, Berlin characterizes Constant 
as “demand[ing] a maximum degree of non-interference compatible with the minimum demands of 
social life.” ISAIAH BERLIN, Political Ideas in the Twentieth Century, in FOUR ESSAYS ON LIBERTY 26 
(1969). 
 52. G.W.F. HEGEL, PHILOSOPHY OF RIGHT (T.M. Knox trans., Oxford Univ. Press 1952) (1821). 
 53. SHLOMO AVINERI, HEGEL’S THEORY OF THE MODERN STATE 142 (1972). 
 54. Id. 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_jurisprudence/vol6/iss2/2
  
 
 
 
 
2014] PUTTING PROGRESS BACK INTO PROGRESSIVE 269 
 
 
 
 
the free market described by the then new science of political economy, 
the rights of individuals to pursue economic self-interest is paramount. In 
the Philosophy of Right, Hegel, like Constant, acknowledges the 
modernity of the free market system, which is at the heart of what he calls 
civil society. But Hegel does not see civil society as the end point of the 
development of modern government. He envisions a role of the state 
beyond merely protecting the functioning of the free market. The modern 
state, in Hegel’s view, must also look to the collective good. But, as he 
argued, the collectivity of modern times should not and indeed could not 
simply be based on returning to the model of collective good found in the 
ancient world, such as the Greek polis. As much as Hegel admired the 
collective civic virtue of the ancient Greeks (what he calls “beautiful 
freedom”), he was convinced that the collective communities of the 
ancients could not be recreated in the modern world.
55
 Rather, the modern 
democratic state had to be based on the conditions of the modern world, 
which entailed a system of representational democracy, rather than the 
direct democracy of the ancient Greeks. Hegel proposed a model of the 
modern state that preserved modern civil society, with its free play of 
individual economic pursuits, but also regulated it in light of the needs of 
the society as a whole. As the Hegelian scholar and political philosopher 
Shlomo Avineri summarizes it, “[c]ivil society thus becomes integrated 
into Hegel’s system as a necessary moment in man’s progress towards his 
realization of the consciousness of freedom. But it is subordinated to the 
higher universality of the state. Adam Smith is thus aufgehoben—both 
preserved and transcended—into the Hegelian system.”56 
Hegel’s dialectical resolution of opposites has been frequently and 
thoroughly critiqued by his contemporaries, by Marx, and by much of 
postmodernist thought—while at the same time strongly influencing all of 
these critics. It is beyond the scope of this Article to address those 
critiques here. My purpose in returning to Hegel is to show that this body 
of thought is still crucial to the problem with which contemporary living 
constitutionalism continues to grapple. Living constitutionalism needs to 
present a narrative of progress in which the earlier moments of 
constitutional rights (the negative liberties of classical liberalism) connect 
up to the later moments of constitutional rights (the positive liberties of 
 
 
 55. As Avineri describes, for Hegel, “[t]he Greek world is the realm of beautiful freedom, which 
discerns the ethical and the beautiful in the multiplicity of forms and nuances.” Id. at 225. However, 
“[t]he polis is a given, not a willed entity. Ethical behaviour is imbued in the individual naturally and 
is not an outcome of a conscious moral choice.” Id. at 225–26 (internal citations omitted). 
 56. Id. at 147. 
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modern liberalism and the welfare state) as a continuous rational story of 
development.
57
 
Comparing Constant with Hegel, we can see that Constant’s account of 
the liberty of the moderns and ancients likewise recounts a philosophy of 
history. However, in Constant’s philosophy of history, the narrative of 
modernity essentially ends with the emergence of the negative individual 
liberty connected with the free market of eighteenth-century economics. 
Constant presents no modern conception of the role of the state. In 
contrast, Hegel’s philosophy of history describes a third moment, the 
emergence of the modern state, which seeks to integrate the type of 
individual economic liberty that Constant describes with the collective 
society strived for by ancient societies.
58
  
Defining the exact contours of the relationship between individual 
liberty and the role of the modern state remains, of course, a vexed and 
much-contested problem.
59
 But my argument here is that this relationship 
should at least be on the table for contemporary living constitutionalism. 
This is why I regard Breyer’s use of Constant’s liberty of the ancients and 
moderns to ground contemporary living constitutionalism as problematic. 
Breyer stresses the active liberty of the ancients as a vital and continuing 
political tradition and thus flips Constant’s distinction on its head. But 
crucial to Constant’s distinction of the two types of liberty is the premise 
that the active liberty of the ancients is no longer possible within the 
conditions of modern society and modern governments. Indeed, 
Constant’s motivation in distinguishing between ancient and modern 
liberty was to oppose what he saw as the dangers of the oppressive 
collectivism of the ancients returning in the guise of the French Revolution 
and Rousseau’s totalizing account of the state.60 Constant’s binary 
 
 
 57. For a discussion of the liberal Hegelian tradition, see JÜRGEN HABERMAS, THE 
PHILOSOPHICAL DISCOURSE OF MODERNITY: TWELVE LECTURES 51–74 (Frederick Lawrence, trans., 
1987) [hereinafter HABERMAS, TWELVE LECTURES]. Francis Fukuyama presents a neoconservative 
account of Hegel in THE END OF HISTORY AND THE LAST MAN (1992). Fukuyama does not discuss the 
relationship of the Hegelian narrative of the state to the American Constitution. 
 58. Along these lines, Guido de Ruggiero, the Hegelian-inspired theorist of the modern liberal 
state presents a dialectical critique and reversal of Constant’s liberty of the moderns and ancients. De 
Ruggiero argues that the modern liberal state is actually a logical development of Constant’s liberty of 
the moderns. Once one grants “the necessity of political liberty to guarantee the rights of individuals,” 
de Ruggiero argues, “this implies their participation in the government . . . .” DE RUGGIERO, supra 
note 44, at 168. Indeed, the commitment to bringing individuals into the political process requires a 
liberal state structured to fully realize the development of political activities. Id. 
 59. See infra Parts VII, VIII. 
 60. De Ruggiero situates Constant’s account of the two liberties in relation to Constant’s reaction 
against the increased power of the state associated with Rousseau’s “general will” and the French 
Revolution. DE RUGGIERO, supra note 44, at 168. De Ruggiero argues that Constant opposed what he 
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opposition between ancient and modern liberty however leaves open the 
central question—how can one redefine the collectivist liberty of the 
ancients in modern terms? As I will discuss in the following sections, 
Hegel’s narrative of progress, which describes the development of the 
modern state as a vehicle for reconciling individual and collective 
freedom, provides a framework for answering this question. 
Justice Breyer, it should be noted, is not alone among contemporary 
living constitutionalists in failing to highlight a narrative of progress and 
the rise of the modern state. In contemporary accounts of living 
constitutionalism, the narrative of the modern state has generally been 
ignored or occluded. This treatment has gone hand in hand with the 
attempt to locate a collectivist principle in some version of the past, rather 
than the present or future. In modern American constitutional theory, this 
looking backward is reflected in what has variously been called “civic 
republicanism,” “classical republicanism,” or “neorepublicanism,” and 
looks to the features of classical Greek and Roman republics with their 
emphasis on civic virtue.
61
 Breyer’s identification of the collectivist 
principles of modern constitutional doctrine with Constant’s “liberty of the 
ancients” reflects this trend. 
Tracing collectivist principles from the past is valuable for living 
constitutionalism. Jack Balkin, a prominent living constitutionalist, argues 
that the principles of the New Deal regulatory state are consistent with the 
original meaning of the Commerce Clause, and supports this by discussing 
the broad meaning of the word “commerce” in eighteenth-century usage.62 
As I discussed above, the Hegelian dialectical account of history describes 
how the structure of civil society is transcended yet preserved in the 
structure of the state. Thus, one side of the Hegelian narrative of progress, 
the preservation side, focuses on the continuity of political principles as 
they develop over time.
63
 But the other side of the dialectic describes the 
 
 
saw as a dangerous resurgence of the liberty of the ancients in the form of the subjection of the 
individual to the collective interests of the state. Id. 
 61. As legal historian G. Edward White describes, proponents of civic republicanism “found a 
historical model for such a perspective in the republican-inspired political and social theories of the 
founders’ generation, which a cadre of historians, writing in the late 1960s and 1970s, had unearthed 
for them.” G. Edward White, The Arrival of History in Constitutional Scholarship, 88 VA. L. REV. 
485, 598 (2002). See also LAURA KALMAN, THE STRANGE CAREER OF LEGAL LIBERALISM 143–63 
(1996). 
 62. Jack M. Balkin, Commerce, 109 MICH. L. REV. 1, 15–23 (2010); JACK M. BALKIN, LIVING 
ORIGINALISM 138–82 (2011) [hereinafter BALKIN, ORIGINALISM]. 
 63. Balkin elaborates his approach to constitutional interpretation (what he calls constitutional 
“construction”) in terms of text and principles in his important recent book, LIVING ORIGINALISM, 
supra note 62. I agree with much of his project of defining a living constitutionalism that responds to 
originalism. However, what Balkin means by the word “principle” is not what I (following the 
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process of transcending, which focuses on change and the distinctive 
features of modernity. I am concerned that contemporary accounts of 
living constitutionalism based on the past—such as Breyer’s emphasis on 
the liberty of the ancients, and Balkin’s emphasis on eighteenth-century 
conceptions of commerce—are too focused on the preservation side. These 
accounts of living constitutionalism attempt to compete with originalism 
in terms of preserving original constitutional principles.
64
 I fear that such 
attempts are bound to lose because living constitutionalism can never beat 
originalism at its game of freezing constitutional principles at their point 
of origins. In trying to do so, past-oriented accounts of living 
constitutionalism end up ignoring or deemphasizing the idea of change for 
the better, which is the traditional strength and core of the liberal narrative 
of progress. Liberalism used to openly acknowledge the distinctive 
modernity of the welfare state as a mark of progress. Failure to maintain 
and defend this core liberal narrative of progress therefore runs the serious 
risk that constitutional developments associated with the modern state will 
be devalued as erosions from the original principles of the Constitution, 
rather than defended as the culminations of those principles.
65
 Scalia’s 
“rot” argument in A Matter of Interpretation proceeds precisely from this 
premise.
66
 
The danger of ignoring the narrative of progress is brought into clearer 
relief for contemporary constitutional theory by Bruce Ackerman’s work. 
Ackerman focuses on the modernity of the regulatory/welfare state 
 
 
Hegelian philosophical tradition) and Ronald Dworkin (discussed in Section 4 below) mean by that 
word. I view Balkin’s constitutional “principles” as more akin to open-ended themes (such as “equal 
protection of the laws”) that each generation of Americans is free to, indeed is obligated to, “flesh 
out,” in their own time. See BALKIN, ORIGINALISM, supra note 62, at 3. Balkin’s constitutional 
principles are, in his terms, “delegated,” id. at 63, 104, 107, by the Founders. See id. at 44–45, 308–09, 
350–52. In contrast, my account of constitutional principles is that such principles have a determinate 
content, both at the founding and in their later versions in modern constitutional doctrine, and that 
there is a rational connection between the determinate content of a constitutional principle in its 
different moments in constitutional history. 
 64. For a discussion of how liberal constitutional theorists have felt compelled to adopt historical 
arguments in reaction to originalism, see Paul Horwitz, The Past, Tense: The History of Crisis—and 
the Crisis of History—in Constitutional Theory, 61 ALB. L. REV. 459, 488–89 (1997). 
 65. A further consequence is that contermporary living constitutionalists often seek to defend 
modern constitutional decisions by appealing to strong theories of stare decisis, rather than directly 
defending such decisions as being legitimate developments of constitutional principles. As Balkin 
keenly notes: 
The irony is that many of the decisions that living constitutionalists fear are inconsistent with 
original meaning are actually consistent with it. By conceding that decisions they admire have 
no basis in the Constitution’s text and principles, living constitutionalists face an unnecessary 
difficulty in justifying the legitimacy of these decisions. 
BALKIN, ORIGINALISM, supra note 62, at 123. 
 66. See SCALIA, MATTER OF INTERPRETATION, supra note 6, at 41. 
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ushered in by the New Deal. He criticizes the legal profession for giving 
legal significance to only two Constitutional moments: The Founding (the 
Constitution and Bill of Rights of 1789), and the Reconstruction (with the 
post-Civil War amendments, most notably the 14th Amendment). The 
accepted legal narrative, according to Ackerman, therefore tells only a 
“two-part story” of Constitutional development. Ackerman contends that 
there is a third great constitutional moment, the New Deal, which results 
in “the constitutional triumph of the activist welfare state.”67 He therefore 
tells a three-part story, which “defines the legal meaning of modernity.”68 
As Ackerman summarizes it, “[a]ll of us live in the modern era that begins 
with the Supreme Court’s ‘switch in time’ in 1937, in which an activist, 
regulatory state is finally accepted as an unchallengeable constitutional 
reality.”69 
The crucial question for contemporary living constitutionalism is 
highlighted by Ackerman’s acknowledgment of the distinctive modernity 
of the American welfare state and the attendant “positive” account of 
liberty involving state intervention in economic and social conditions. 
How does one present a constitutional narrative that explains the 
development of the new conception of liberty initiated by the modern 
welfare state? Either one can present a narrative that somehow connects 
modern collectivist liberty to traditional individualist (“negative”) liberty, 
or one must concede that collectivist liberty represent a wholly novel 
modern phenomenon.  And such a concession runs the risk of 
delegitimizing collectivist liberty as a rupture in the constitutional 
narrative. 
Ackerman’s solution is to say that the Constitution was, in effect, 
amended through the legislation created during the New Deal. This, as he 
acknowledges, is a controversial solution since it allows the amendment of 
the Constitution outside the provisions of Article Five. It is beyond the 
scope of this Article to address the controversy over Ackerman’s account 
of constitutional rule-making outside Article Five.
70
  
This Article proposes another approach to legitimizing modern 
constitutional doctrine. Like Ackerman, I want to acknowledge the 
distinctive modernity of modern constitutional doctrine. However, I think 
the development of modern constitutional doctrine can be explained 
through a narrative of progress that describes the movement from the old 
 
 
 67. 1 BRUCE ACKERMAN, WE THE PEOPLE: FOUNDATIONS 40 (1991). 
 68. Id. 
 69. Id. 
 70. For a discussion, see KALMAN, supra note 61, at 212–29. 
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liberalism of individual rights to the new liberalism of the modern 
welfare/regulatory state as a self-unified development of constitutional 
principles. Ronald Dworkin’s account of the internal coherence of legal 
principles is crucially important to explaining this. I therefore turn next to 
consider Dworkin’s work in relation to a new narrative of constitutional 
progress. 
IV. RONALD DWORKIN’S INTEGRITY AND INTENTION IN LEGAL 
PRINCIPLES 
A narrative of constitutional progress provides an explanation of how 
constitutional doctrine appears to change over time and yet nonetheless 
expresses a coherent structure of intentions and purposes. Originalism, 
whatever its other theoretical shortcomings, has no problem in describing 
the Constitution as an intentional legal structure. According to various 
accounts of originalism, the Constitution either expresses the actual intent 
of the Founders, or the Founders’ apparent intent, as expressed in the 
language of the text and as its audience at the time of its drafting would 
have interpreted that language.
71
 Living constitutionalism rejects 
originalism’s attempt to limit the scope of constitutional intention to these 
two accounts of Founder intention, both of which freeze intention at a 
point of origin. In rejecting an originalist account of constitutional 
intention, I am not, however, rejecting all accounts of intention. To the 
contrary, I believe that intention is integral to any account of constitutional 
meaning. The theoretical movements associated with the Left, 
Deconstruction, and Critical Legal Studies, however, generally proclaimed 
the indeterminacy of the text and rejected the very idea that intention can 
determine meaning.
72
 While deconstructionist critiques of intention served 
a valuable purpose in spurring a reconsideration of ossified legal dogma, 
such critiques now offer no help in shoring up the progressive 
constitutional tradition against originalism’s claims to be the exclusive 
interpretive method faithful to constitutional principles. Where then can 
the progressive tradition turn for a non-originalist account of intention? 
Ronald Dworkin’s work is distinctive in progressive legal theory because 
 
 
 71. Walter Benn Michaels, A Defense of Old Originalism, 31 W. NEW ENG. L. REV. 21 (2009). 
 72. Much of the application of deconstructionist literary theory to legal theory was in the service 
of some version of the argument that the inherent indeterminacy of language reveals that all purported 
legal interpretation is only disguised political policy-making. See RONALD DWORKIN, LAW’S EMPIRE, 
271–75 (1986). For a review of the textual indeterminacy argument in deconstruction and legal theory, 
see David Aram Kaiser, Entering onto the Path of Inference: Textualism and Contextualism in the 
Bruton Trilogy, 44 U.S.F. L. REV. 95 (2009) [hereinafter Kaiser, Path of Inference]. 
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he sought to use interpretive theory to support the possibility of normative 
legal interpretation rather than to undermine that possibility. I therefore 
turn to a consideration of Dworkin’s work in relation to a constitutional 
narrative of progress. 
In Law’s Empire, Dworkin offers an account of judicial decision-
making as “integrity in law,” which treats the continuity of legal principles 
as central to modern jurisprudence.
73
 As Dworkin explains, “[t]he 
adjudicative principle of integrity instructs judges to identify legal rights 
and duties, so far as possible, on the assumption that they were all created 
by a single author—the community personified—expressing a coherent 
conception of justice and fairness.”74 Dworkin articulates what he means 
by “community personified” by using the now-famous analogy of the 
“chain novel.”75 The judge who crafts an opinion is like the latest writer in 
a group of novelists, working one after another in time, to compose a chain 
novel. Dworkin’s analogy describes the process of legal decision-making 
as preserving the intentional structure of the principles of law, “each 
novelist in the chain interprets the chapters he has been given in order to 
write a new chapter, which is then added to what the next novelist 
receives, and so on.”76 Dworkin rejects the legal realist view that reduces 
legal judgments to a series of discrete decisions whose relationship bears 
no more than a bare chronological connection to each other. He states that 
integrity in law “insists that the law . . . contains not only the narrow 
explicit content of these [past] decisions, but also, more broadly, the 
scheme of principles necessary to justify them.”77  
By stressing the coherence of legal principles through the model of a 
single (albeit multi-generational) author, Dworkin acknowledges the 
centrality of intention for any account of interpretation. As he states, “even 
if we reject the thesis that creative interpretation aims to discover some 
actual historical intention, the concept of intention nevertheless provides 
the formal structure for all interpretive claims.”78 As Dworkin explains 
further, “an interpretation is by nature a report of a purpose; it proposes a 
way of seeing what is interpreted—a social practice or tradition as much as 
a text or painting—as if this were the product of a decision to pursue one 
set of themes or visions or purposes or ‘point,’ rather than another.”79 
 
 
 73. DWORKIN, supra note 72, at 225–75. 
 74. Id. at 225 (emphasis added). 
 75. Id. at 228–32. 
 76. Id. at 229. 
 77. Id. at 227. 
 78. Id. at 58. 
 79. Id. at 58–59. 
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But whose purpose has Dworkin’s judge/interpreter found in coming to 
a coherent view of the law? One line of criticism of Dworkin is that his 
account of legal interpretation creates an artificial author, to which one can 
ascribe all the meanings in the law that one wishes while pretending to be 
engaging in interpretation.
80
 The creation of such an artificial author might 
appear to be a bad faith effort to justify wholesale re-writing under the 
guise of interpretation.
81
 But in the Hegelian tradition, Dworkin’s multi-
generational communal author of the law is not an arbitrarily constructed 
person, but is, rather, reason itself. The Hegelian narrative of progress sees 
reason itself as the author of the coherent whole of the law. 
To call reason the author of the law may sound odd to the modern ear, 
but the concept of law as the embodiment of reason has been an orthodox 
belief for much of the history of the law. Blackstone famously states this 
tradition in relation to the common law: “the law is the perfection of 
reason, . . . it always intends to conform thereto, and what is not reason is 
not law.”82 Historically, the concept of law as an embodiment of reason 
has often been connected to an implied or explicit theological worldview.
83
 
According to this theological worldview, God is the author of all creation, 
including the principles of law. Not surprisingly, contemporary advocates 
of common law constitutionalism, such as David Strauss (whom I discuss 
below), are eager to excise any trace of theology or metaphysics from the 
common law tradition.
84
 Certainly, a contemporary secular account of the 
law cannot be based on an explicitly theological worldview. But, as I will 
argue below, a robust theory of living constitutionalism needs to affirm 
some notion of the development of reason in history. 
Dworkin, however, does not focus on the common law’s traditional 
emphasis on reason. Although Dworkin’s own analogy of the chain novel 
suggests the traditional common law narrative of the development of 
reason across history, Dworkin is suspicious about giving history a central 
role in legal interpretation because he believes that doing so would support 
originalism’s premise that a law’s meaning “is fixed in some initial act of 
 
 
 80. Steven D. Smith, Idolatry in Constitutional Interpretation, in PAUL F. CAMPOS, PIERRE 
SCHLAG, & STEPHEN D. SMITH, AGAINST THE LAW 168 (1996). 
 81. STEVEN D. SMITH, LAW’S QUANDARY 146–50 (2004) [hereinafter SMITH, LAW’S 
QUANDARY]. 
 82. 1 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES ON THE LAWS OF ENGLAND 70 (Legal Classics 
Library, 1983) (1765) (facsimile of first edition). For further discussion, see Kaiser, Perfection of 
Reason, supra note 17, at 29–55. 
 83. SMITH, LAW’S QUANDARY, supra note 81, at 45–48, 151–53. 
 84. David A. Strauss, Common Law Constitutional Interpretation, 63 U. CHI. L. REV. 877, 894 
(1996) [hereinafter Strauss, Constitutional Interpretation]. 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_jurisprudence/vol6/iss2/2
  
 
 
 
 
2014] PUTTING PROGRESS BACK INTO PROGRESSIVE 277 
 
 
 
 
creation.”85 For this reason, Dworkin’s account lacks a strong historical 
narrative linking up the various prior judicial opinions out of which 
Dworkin’s judge creates a coherent account of the law. As Dworkin states, 
his model of integrity “does not require consistency in principle over all 
historical stages of a community’s law; it does not require that judges try 
to understand the law they enforce as continuous in principle with the 
abandoned law of a previous century or even a previous generation.”86 
Dworkin’s model of integrity “commands a horizontal rather than vertical 
consistency of principle across the range of legal standards the community 
now enforces.”87 By “horizontal consistency” Dworkin means that the 
judge who interprets law “with integrity” will view the law as a coherent 
system of legal principles. From this standpoint, the judge will view the 
law as containing, not just the narrow explicit content of prior legal 
opinions, but “also, more broadly, the scheme of principles necessary to 
justify them.”88 Regardless of the historical intent of the legal decisions of 
the past, Dworkin’s judge will strive to make the law “the best it can be,” 
that is, construe it within a system of legal principles defensible from the 
perspective of the judge at the present moment.
89
 In contrast, a narrative of 
constitutional progress based on reason takes on the additional task of 
reconciling and integrating the historical intentions of legal decisions, 
“vertically,” that is, across the historical stages of the law’s development. 
Dworkin thus describes the coherence of the law in terms of the 
individual judge, who, through an individual act of creative interpretation, 
arranges an area of the law into a coherent whole as part of the act of 
rendering a decision. Commentators have criticized Dworkin’s account on 
the basis that “[w]e demand integrity of our law as a whole and of the 
judiciary collectively, yet on Dworkin’s account of interpretation, 
integrity’s commission is executed by judges individually.”90 This 
criticism points to Dworkin’s failure to integrate interpretation “across 
time.”91 My discussion suggests a reconsideration of the narrative of 
 
 
 85. DWORKIN, supra note 72, at 347. 
 86. Id. 
 87. Id. 
 88. Id. 
 89. See id. at 53. What Dworkin describes as “creative interpretation,” “strives to make an object 
the best it can be, as an instance of some assumed enterprise . . . .” Id. 
 90. 11 GERALD J. POSTEMA, A TREATISE OF LEGAL PHILOSOPHY AND GENERAL 
JURISPRUDENCE: LEGAL PHILOSOPHY IN THE TWENTIETH CENTURY: THE COMMON LAW WORLD 455 
(2011) (internal citations omitted). 
 91. Id. Balkin characterizes Dworkin’s integrity in legal interpretation as trying to “make sense 
of the whole of past judicial decisions, justified by the best theory of political morality available.” 
BALKIN, ORIGINALISM, supra note 62, 308. I think Balkin attributes more historical integration to 
Washington University Open Scholarship
  
 
 
 
 
278 WASHINGTON UNIVERSITY JURISPRUDENCE REVIEW [VOL. 6:257 
 
 
 
 
progress as a way of applying Dworkin’s account of integrity in law across 
time. 
Dworkin’s theory of integrity in law therefore stresses the coherence of 
legal principles from within the interpretive standpoint of the individual 
judge, but Dworkin fails to account for law as a collectively changing 
practice in history. The theory I turn to next, the contemporary common 
law constitutionalism of David Strauss, does the reverse. He stresses 
historical change in legal decisions, but fails to provide an account of the 
coherence of constitutional principles. 
V. DAVID STRAUSS’ LIVING CONSTITUTIONALISM: COMMON LAW 
CHANGE WITHOUT PROGRESS 
The work of David Strauss presents an extensively elaborated 
contemporary account of living constitutionalism based on common law 
judging.
92
 Strauss does not shy away from describing constitutional 
interpretation as a process of change. But he does avoid describing that 
change as part of a narrative of progress or a philosophy of history. 
Indeed, Strauss strives to jettison what he calls the “mystical component” 
of the common law, which he regards as the source of conservatism in the 
common law tradition.
93
 In so doing, however, he also jettisons the strong 
narrative of progress to which the progressive tradition has traditionally 
appealed and which contemporary living constitutionalism needs to 
reclaim in the face of originalism.  
Central to Strauss’ theory of common law constitutionalism is his 
rejection of originalism’s focus on the text of the Constitution. Strauss 
writes, “[t]he common law tradition rejects the notion that law must be 
derived from some authoritative source and finds it instead in 
understandings that evolve over time.”94 By using the word “evolve” 
Strauss implies change for the better, or at least change consonant with the 
needs of the contemporary moment. However, Strauss does not refer to a 
 
 
Dworkin’s project than Dworkin wants to provide. However, it is precisely because Dworkin has such 
a philosophically substantial account of legal principles that the question of whether and how these 
principles are integrated across history arises in considering his work.  
 92. DAVID A. STRAUSS, THE LIVING CONSTITUTION (2010); Strauss, Constitutional 
Interpretation, supra note 84, at 877; David A. Strauss, Common Law, Common Ground, and 
Jefferson’s Principle, 112 YALE L.J. 1717 (2003); David A. Strauss, Originalism, Precedent, and 
Candor, 22 CONST. COMMENT. 299 (2005); David A. Strauss, The Common Law Genius of the Warren 
Court, 49 WM. & MARY L. REV. 845 (2008) [hereinafter Strauss, Common Law Genius]; David A. 
Strauss, Why Conservatives Shouldn’t Be Originalists, 31 HARV. J. L. & PUB. POL’Y 969 (2008). 
 93. Strauss, Constitutional Interpretation, supra note 84, at 893–94. 
 94. Id. at 879. 
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Hegelian narrative of progress. Rather, Strauss appeals to Edmund Burke’s 
idea of traditionalism, the idea that practices change and accrue over time 
by a process of social acceptance, and that social acceptance over time 
itself provides legitimization to practices.
95
 Strauss sees Burke’s 
traditionalism as a culmination of the common law tradition.
96
 
There is a certain historical irony to the fact that a contemporary 
proponent of progressive living constitutionalism like Strauss should focus 
on the thought of Edmund Burke.
97
 While Burke undoubtedly stands as 
one of the most influential figures in the Anglo-American political 
tradition, Burke’s orientation is fundamentally opposed to modern liberal 
progressivism. Burke expressed his thought in the context of criticizing 
both the French Revolution and the entire concept of political change 
based on principles. The embracing of Burke by contemporary defenders 
of living constitutionalism has resulted in an ironic reversal of progressive 
and conservative positions. Formerly, progressives like Thomas Paine 
appealed to principles as the basis of political reform, and pragmatic 
conservatives like Edmund Burke resisted the call in the name of 
tradition.
98
 Today, it is the conservative originalists, led by Justice Scalia, 
who appeal to principles, while the liberal defenders of living 
constitutionalism appeal to Burkean notions of tradition and 
incrementalism.
99
 
Strauss does acknowledge that much of the common law tradition in 
general, and Burke in particular, are hostile to progressive thought: 
“[h]istorically the common law tradition has been burdened with a degree 
of mysticism and also, at times, with excessive conservativism.”100 Strauss 
regards the common law tradition’s conservatism as wrapped up with its 
mysticism and he seeks to purge his theory of both elements: “[t]he 
common law ideology often had, in addition, a mystical component, with 
its appeal to ‘time out of mind’ and the ineffable spirit of the English 
people. But traditionalism need not have . . . any such mystical aspect. It 
can be placed on an entirely rational footing.”101 In order to place 
 
 
 95. Id. at 893–94. 
 96. Id. 
 97. See Andrew C. Spiropoulos, Just Not Who We Are: A Critique of Common Law 
Constitutionalism, 54 VILL. L. REV. 181, 181 (2009) (“All of a sudden Edmund Burke is ‘in’”). 
 98. Kaiser, Perfection of Reason, supra note 17, 29–45. 
 99. “[W]hen one considers the Court’s liberty decisions in their totality, an unmistakable 
characteristic that emerges is their incremental quality.” GOODWIN LIU, PAMELA S. KARLAN & 
CHRISTOPHER H. SCHROEDER, KEEPING FAITH WITH THE CONSTITUTION 150 (2010). 
 100. Strauss, Constitutional Interpretation, supra note 84, at 888 (citation omitted). 
 101. Id. at 894 (citations omitted). 
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traditionalism on such a rational footing, Strauss rejects the common law’s 
strong metaphysical connection between the present and the past, which he 
characterizes as “establishing a quasi-religious bond with the past or as 
maintaining a national identity.”102  
But does a “rational” account of the common law demand a rejection of 
all strong metaphysical narratives, including the Hegelian narrative of 
progress? The Hegelian narrative of progress has important similarities to 
the traditional role of reason in the common law as described by 
Blackstone. As discussed above, under Blackstone’s view, the common 
law was a rational whole and each new part of the law was revealed 
through a new court decision. According to this concept, the common law 
judge, in announcing new law, is discovering the law that already existed 
within a rational whole system of the law, and not creating new law. As 
we have seen, Scalia rejects this traditional common law justification, and 
argues that this is just an ideological cover for a judge’s desire to create 
new law.
103
 For Scalia, common law judging is unrestrained by any set of 
core principles. He therefore sharply distinguishes common law judging 
from the interpretation of the Constitution, which, Scalia argues, is 
precisely designed to embody a set of core principles and embed them as 
rights so that future generations cannot readily take them away.
104
 
Ironically, Strauss, the great contemporary proponent of common law 
constitutionalism, ends up embracing the same view of common law 
judging held by Scalia, the great contemporary opponent of common law 
constitutionalism. Both men regard the practice of common law judging as 
essentially changeable and not bound by any set of core principles. 
Strauss regards the lack of restraining core principles in common law 
judging as a positive quality because he believes this allows living 
constitutionalism to adapt the Constitution to the needs of the present. My 
argument here however is that, by adopting this position, Strauss throws 
out the proverbial baby with the bathwater. In his desire to free up 
constitutional interpretation from the constraints of the past, Strauss also 
jettisons the most compelling justification for living constitutionalism, the 
Hegelian narrative of progress, which is based on the idea that principles 
are not static and can be seen as, in some sense, entailing their own 
development. This Hegelian conception is congruent with the traditional 
common law view that the decisions of judges express particular instances 
of the rational whole of the law. 
 
 
 102. Id. at 895. 
 103. SCALIA, MATTER OF INTERPRETATION, supra note 6, at 10. 
 104. Id. at 40. 
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The idea of constitutional principles somehow determining their own 
development may sound metaphysical to some. But this is no more 
metaphysical than the sense an interpreter feels towards discovering the 
apparent intention of a text.
105
 The unfolding self-determination of the law 
is another way of describing Dworkin’s integrity in the interpretation of 
the law as the recognition of a multi-generational structure of intentions. 
Thus the chain novelist in Dworkin’s analogy both interprets the existing 
intention of the existing novel and, in continuing it, recasts the set of 
intentions. So too the judge recasts the intentions of the law through the 
constraints of the felt intentions of the principles. The Hegelian narrative 
of progress can be seen as describing the continuity of the principles 
through changes that appear contingent in relation to history but also 
appear to involve the unfolding of the rational structure of the principle 
itself.  
However, what of the concerns raised by Strauss’s comments that a 
narrative of progress presupposes a nationalistic and religious narrative 
unacceptable to a contemporary secular society?
 
It should be emphasized 
that the Hegelian narrative of progress differs from the traditional English 
common law view of reason because the Hegelian narrative stresses a 
dynamic and future-oriented account of the unfolding of reason in history. 
In contrast, the English common law tradition tended to place the rational 
whole of the law in some past moment of origin, such as an unwritten 
“ancient constitution.”106 In this way, the Hegelian narrative of progress 
avoids Strauss’s criticism of the nationalistic conservatism of the common 
law tradition’s use of reason. 
I acknowledge that, as a cultural form, the narrative of progress did 
originate in theological accounts of providential history.
107
 But the 
narrative of progress has undergone and continues to undergo a process of 
secularization. Hegel’s philosophy of history redefined providential 
history in philosophical terms. For Hegel, reason’s movement through 
history does not indicate the providential control of an external God but 
 
 
 105. The interpreter’s discovery of apparent authorial intention is felt as a kind of constraint. As 
Stanley Fish has stated, “[i]nterpretation cannot be a rational activity in the absence of such a 
constraint.” Stanley Fish, Intention Is All There Is: A Critical Analysis of Aharon Barak’s Purposive 
Interpretation in Law, 29 CARDOZO L. REV. 1109, 1114 (2008). For a further discussion, see David 
Aram Kaiser, Path of Inference, supra note 72, at 109–12. 
 106. The nineteenth century poet, literary critic, and philosopher Samuel Taylor Coleridge 
described the ancient English constitution as the evolving embodiment of reason in his political 
treatise, 10 THE COLLECTED WORKS OF SAMUEL TAYLOR COLERIDGE: ON THE CONSTITUTION OF 
CHURCH AND STATE: (John Colmer, ed. Princeton Univ. Press 1976) (1830). See KAISER, 
NATIONALISM, supra note 17, at 59–73; Kaiser, Perfection of Reason, supra note 17, at 29–55.  
 107. ROBERT NISBET, HISTORY OF THE IDEA OF PROGRESS 284 (1980). 
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rather describes the development of rationality in and through human 
history.
108
 To the extent that Hegel’s philosophy preserved a theological 
worldview, the thinkers influenced by him further secularized his account, 
and reinterpreted it into the most modern and rationalistic terms available 
to them. One line of descent leads to Marx’s materialist dialectic, another 
line of descent to Max Weber and modern sociology.
109
 The core of 
Hegel’s philosophy of history, which remains crucial for living 
constitutionalism, is that human history is an unfolding of a process of 
reason that human authors collectively create and by which these human 
authors are also determined.
110
 
VI. SOCIAL MOVEMENTS AND THE NARRATIVE OF PROGRESS  
Progressive social movements, such as the abolitionist, feminist, and 
civil rights movements, have traditionally appealed to a narrative of 
progress by arguing that what appears to be a change in constitutional 
doctrine is rather the development of the full implications of existing 
constitutional rights.
111
 Thus antebellum abolitionists argued that the Due 
Process Clause alone already provided authority for Congress to abolish 
slavery because the principle of liberty contained therein was antithetical 
to slavery.
112
  
 
 
 108. Richard Rorty’s pragmatist account of Hegel reflects this view: 
For Hegel told a story about history as the growth of freedom, the gradual dawning of the idea 
that human beings are on their own, because there is nothing more to God than his march 
through the world—nothing more to the divine than the history of the human adventure. 
RORTY, ACHIEVING OUR COUNTRY, supra note 18, at 21. 
 109. See HABERMAS, TWELVE LECTURES, supra note 57, at 51–52. 
 110. I expand on this in the conclusion below. 
 111. For a discussion of this in the suffragist movement, see Reva B. Siegel, Text in Contest: 
Gender and the Constitution from a Social Movement Perspective, 150 U. PA. L. REV. 297, 334–37 
(2001) [hereinafter Siegel, Text in Contest]. So too advocates of gay rights have argued that the 
Founders “wrote a binding set of laws that were meant to surprise them. . . . They believed in the 
progress of liberty, which they based on their conception of human beings as rational creatures.” 
MICHAEL NAVA & ROBERT DAWIDOFF, CREATED EQUAL: WHY GAY RIGHTS MATTER TO AMERICA 
28 (1994). 
 112. In discussing the argument of abolitionist Alvan Stewart, a prominent historian of the 
Fourteenth Amendment notes: 
The whole system of power relations between the states and the federal government was to be 
rearranged and redistributed by a simple declaratory statement of what always had been true, 
as if no change were being made. An institution, deep-rooted in the economic, social, and 
political fabric of a large segment of the nation . . . was to be uprooted, struck out of 
constitutional existence, “not as a new principle, but as an old one . . . .” 
JACOBUS TENBROEK, EQUAL UNDER LAW: THE ANTISLAVERY ORIGINS OF THE FOURTEENTH 
AMENDMENT 69 (1965). 
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Reva Siegel, a prominent contemporary expositor of living 
constitutionalism, has compellingly described how social movements have 
influenced the development of constitutional doctrine.
113
 As I discuss 
below, Siegel has criticized Strauss’ common law constitutionalism for 
limiting itself to a legal realist view of the Constitution as simply being the 
coercive power of the current set of judicial decisions. In contrast, Siegel 
has described how social movements have appealed to constitutional 
principles as existing independently of judicial decisions and how the 
appeal to constitutional principles has justified the emergence of new 
constitutional understandings. Her account thus highlights how important 
a narrative of progress based on evolving constitutional principles has 
been for progressive social movements. However, as I will discuss below, 
Siegel describes the movement of constitutional principles in history in 
terms of a source of rhetorical power for social movements. Like other 
contemporary living constitutionalists, she avoids directly endorsing a 
narrative of progress. 
As discussed earlier, Strauss rejects the burden of connecting modern 
constitutional doctrine with the text of the Constitution. Modern 
constitutional doctrine need not connect with the text of the Constitution 
because, for Strauss, what legitimizes modern constitutional doctrine is not 
the text of the Constitution but rather the fact that the doctrine has been 
accepted over time. Because Strauss wants to jettison the whole problem 
of connecting modern doctrine with the text of the Constitution, he ends 
up expressing an extreme form of legal realism: the law is what judges say 
it is; the Constitution means what judges say it means. Thus, Siegel 
characterizes Strauss’ position as “a sophisticated and frank kind of legal 
realism.”114  
Strauss’ form of frank legal realism may appear to solve the problem of 
reconciling contemporary constitutional doctrine with the text of the 
Constitution, but such legal realism ultimately comes at the price of 
delegitimizing the Constitution. To see this, we need to turn to the useful 
contrast that the legal philosopher Jürgen Habermas has drawn between 
“facticity” and “validity” models of the law.115 Under the facticity model, 
people submit to the law as a coercive external force. Thus, Siegel 
 
 
 113. See Reva B. Siegel, Text in Contest, supra note 111; Jack M. Balkin & Reva B. Siegel, 
Principles, Practices, & Social Movements, 154 U. PA. L. REV. 927, 946–50 (2006). 
 114. Siegel, Text in Contest, supra note 111, at 328. 
 115. On this distinction between facticity and validity in the law, “legal norms as both enforceable 
laws and laws of freedom,” see JÜRGEN HABERMAS, BETWEEN FACTS AND NORMS 28–31 (William 
Rehg trans., 1996) [hereinafter HABERMAS, FACTS AND NORMS]. 
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describes Strauss’ view as a “classically instrumentalist view of 
constitutional lawmaking” based on the assumption “that the purpose of 
law is to enforce society’s norms by regulating the conduct of those who 
would resist them.”116 In contrast, under a validity model of the law, 
people submit to the law because they are convinced of its validity; that is, 
they see law as a principle of freedom that they themselves endorse, rather 
than as an external prohibition. Under a facticity model of the law, like 
that of Strauss, it makes no sense to distinguish between what the 
Constitution really means and what a judge says it means. Strauss has no 
account of constitutional meaning that is independent and separate from a 
judge’s pronouncement of it. Under a validity model of the law, however, 
people construe the meaning of the Constitution independently of what 
judges say that meaning is. Siegel expresses this validity model of the 
Constitution in criticizing Strauss, and in describing the importance of 
social movements to the development of progressive constitutional 
doctrine. 
Siegel begins her critique of Strauss by rejecting a deconstructionist 
view that progressive constitutional arguments are based on the 
indeterminacy of the text of the Constitution: “it is not by proclaiming the 
semantic indeterminacy of the Constitution that citizens make claims—to 
courts or each other—about the Constitution’s meaning . . . .”117 Rather, 
Siegel argues, progressive movements have engaged in “something like 
the contrary”: “[c]itizens invoke the text of the Constitution, properly 
interpreted or amended in light of our constitutional traditions, as a 
foundation, having meaning that can be ascertained apart from the 
pronouncements of those authorized to interpret it or the preferences of 
those who live under it.”118 Thus Siegel describes how progressive social 
movements have appealed to a meaning of the constitutional text 
independent of what judges have said it means or the meaning that people 
might want it to have in order to support their interests. By rejecting 
Strauss’ legal realist view of common law constitutionalism and stressing 
how progressive social movements have appealed to independent 
constitutional principles, Siegel’s account shows some similarities to 
Scalia’s account of the Constitution as a distinctive set of principles that 
are outside and beyond the process of common law judging. Furthermore, 
 
 
 116. Siegel, Text in Contest, supra note 111, at 333. 
 117. Id. at 323. 
 118. Id. See also BALKIN, ORIGINALISM, supra note 62, 83–84. 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_jurisprudence/vol6/iss2/2
  
 
 
 
 
2014] PUTTING PROGRESS BACK INTO PROGRESSIVE 285 
 
 
 
 
like Scalia, she emphasizes the importance of a written constitution.
119
 
Siegel, however, expressly rejects any conservative project of freezing 
constitutional principles at their point of origin, and argues instead for the 
“ongoing public authorship” of the Constitution.120 
What however is the relationship of history to Siegel’s account of the 
democratic authorship of the Constitution? On the one hand, history seems 
crucial. Siegel states, “[h]istory matters in our constitutional culture, not 
merely because it is a source of constraint, but because it is a source of 
understanding that guides our judgments and gives them meaning.”121 But 
Siegel’s discussion, like much of contemporary living constitutionalism, 
displays ambivalence towards how constitutional meaning is revealed in 
history. Is the appeal to history merely a pragmatic use of rhetoric? Or is 
there actually a way in which the constitutional principles of the past are 
connected to the principles urged by progressive movements? Siegel urges 
both views: “We look to the past as we make pragmatic judgments about 
how to vindicate constitutional values in the present. And we look to the 
past as we struggle to define ourselves as a nation acting in history, united 
imaginatively and ethically across generations as well as communities.”122 
But without a robust philosophy of history and a narrative of progress, 
how does one unite oneself imaginatively and ethically across 
generations? This question defines the problem faced by contemporary 
living constitutionalists.
123
  
As Siegel argues, appeals to history have rhetorical force in 
constitutional arguments: “[c]ollective memory . . . supplies a language for 
its members to argue with one another about the community’s grounds and 
aims, enabling it to evolve in history.”124 But, because of her criticism of 
originalism, Siegel is wary of granting history a role beyond being a 
common language of constitutional argument or a sociological factor 
explaining the motivations of political actors. Thus, in Text in Context, she 
sets forth a sociological account of “legal culture” as “those 
 
 
 119. “Setting forth the terms of the constitutional compact in a writing signifies a commitment to 
transparency in government. The terms of government are to be open, accessible, contestable, and 
revisable.” Siegel, Text in Contest, supra note 111, at 314. 
 120. Id. at 315. 
 121. Id. at 304. 
 122. Id. at 343 (citation omitted). 
 123. Jeb Rubenfeld’s engaging account of constitutional interpretation is based on a people’s 
commitment across time to a written constitution. See generally JEB RUBENFELD, FREEDOM AND TIME: 
A THEORY OF CONSTITUTIONAL SELF-GOVERNMENT (2001); JEB RUBENFELD, REVOLUTION BY 
JUDICIARY (2005). Rubenfeld’s work, however, does not directly engage the issues of progress and the 
philosophy of history. 
 124. Siegel, Originalism’s Dead Hand, supra note 7, at 1423. 
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understandings and practices that give shape to a society’s legal system, 
including but not limited to the formal procedures it designates as 
lawmaking.”125 But she defers the question of “whether this account of 
legal culture is part of an ‘internal’ or ‘external’ understanding of the legal 
system.”126 To be internal to the legal system would mean that, like 
Dworkin’s integrity in legal interpretation, one believes the constitutional 
principles of the past actually have some form of conceptual connection to 
the purportedly changed or evolved constitutional principles of the 
present. But to take an external view, one merely has to ascribe this belief 
as the motivation of others, and thus bracket or defer the question of the 
actual conceptual connection between constitutional principles of the past 
and the present. 
Taking an external view makes it easier to criticize originalism, but 
comes at the cost of undermining the progressive tradition’s own narrative 
of progress. For example, in criticizing Heller, Siegel describes how the 
arguments proffered by gun rights advocates resonate with contemporary 
concerns. She observes that “[c]laims about the past express contemporary 
identities, relationships, and concerns, and express deep normative 
convictions.”127 She contends that the originalist’s appeal to the original 
meaning of the Second Amendment is, in effect, a rhetorical cover for 
what is actually a form of living constitutionalism practiced by the Right. 
The arguments of the gun rights advocates, she concludes, fail to live up to 
the “positivist lawmaking model” that originalism proclaims as the 
justification of originalism over living constitutionalism as a method of 
constitutional interpretation.
128
 While Siegel thus masterfully turns the 
tables on originalist Second Amendment advocates, she does not provide a 
normative account of what a “good faith” appeal to history would be. 
In summary, Siegel criticizes Strauss’ form of legal realism and argues 
for the value of the idea of a shared constitutional past. But she does not 
present a philosophy of history that would support her appeal to a shared 
constitutional past and provide continuity between original constitutional 
principles and what she sees as their “evolved” forms today. Siegel’s 
reluctance to acknowledge a robust role for a philosophy of history for 
constitutional principles is similar to Strauss’ reluctance to provide a 
robust account of textual interpretation. The puzzle raised by Strauss’ 
account of common law constitutionalism is: why should we act as if legal 
 
 
 125. Siegel, Text in Contest, supra note 111, at 318 (footnote omitted). 
 126. Id. at 318–19 n.56. 
 127. Siegel, Originalism’s Dead Hand, supra note 7, at 1420. 
 128. Id. 
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texts determine the law if we have no actual conviction that legal texts 
have a determinate meaning? Similarly, the puzzle raised by Siegel’s 
account of social movements and constitutional change is: why should we 
appeal to history as meaningful to constitutional argument unless we have 
some basis for believing that there is an actual continuity between original 
constitutional principles and modern constitutional doctrine? As this 
Article argues, advocates of living constitutionalism need to reclaim a 
version of Hegel’s narrative of progress to validate their appeals to the 
constitutional past. 
VII. “A DUTY RESTING SOMEWHERE”: THE APPOINTMENT OF COUNSEL 
AND THE WELFARE STATE 
Strauss uses the right of an indigent criminal defendant to have counsel 
appointed as an example of a modern constitutional right that, he argues, is 
not based on the text of the Constitution, but rather is the result of a 
common law constitutional development.
129
 The Sixth Amendment gives a 
criminal defendant the right “to have the assistance of counsel for his 
defense.”130 Strauss contends that “[t]here is little doubt that the original 
understanding of this provision was that the government may not forbid a 
defendant from having the assistance of retained counsel.”131 As he notes, 
according to modern Sixth Amendment constitutional doctrine, associated 
most famously with Gideon v. Wainwright, the government must provide 
counsel for defendants who cannot afford it when charged with serious 
crimes.
132
 Strauss notes that the modern rule “fits comfortably with the 
language” of the Sixth Amendment, and the language has been used to 
support it.
133
 But, Strauss objects that “in fact it is just a coincidence—
almost a matter of homonymy—that the modern right to counsel is 
supported by the language of the Sixth Amendment.”134 He nonetheless 
believes it is legitimate to use this coincidence of language to justify the 
modern rule because society has agreed to treat the language of the 
Constitution as a common ground. An interpretation of the Constitution is 
legitimate, Strauss argues, as long as it “can be reconciled with some 
plausible ordinary meaning of the text,” even though, as Strauss appears to 
 
 
 129. Strauss, Constitutional Interpretation, supra note 84, at 877, 919–20; Strauss, Common Law 
Genius, supra note 92, at 868–71. 
 130. U.S. CONST. amend. VI. 
 131. Strauss, Constitutional Interpretation, supra note 84, at 919–20. 
 132. Id. at 920. 
 133. Id. 
 134. Id. 
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concede here, the modern meaning has no connection with the Framers’ 
original intention for the Sixth Amendment.
135
 
Strauss’ example of an indigent defendant’s right to appointed counsel 
is an important instance of the development of a modern constitutional 
right, and is precisely what a theory of living constitutionalism should 
defend as legitimate. I think, however, that Strauss unnecessarily concedes 
the interpretative game to the originalists by abandoning any claim to a 
historical connection between the ostensible original meaning of the Sixth 
Amendment and the modern meaning as expressed in Gideon. I will 
instead offer an account of this right that stresses the conceptual 
connection between its original and modern meanings through a narrative 
of progress of the modern state. As I will discuss below, an indigent 
defendant’s right to appointed counsel is conceptually implicit in the right 
to be represented by counsel. This conceptual connection was already 
perceived at the time of the Sixth Amendment, but was not universally 
acknowledged as giving rise to a duty by the state. Judicial recognition of 
the necessity of this conceptual connection emerged alongside the 
emergence of the duties of the modern state. 
Strauss’ account of common law constitutionalism puts great emphasis 
on the incremental nature of changes in constitutional doctrine. The United 
States Supreme Court, he argues, does not simply announce a radical new 
principle in a case. Rather, what appears to be a new principle is preceded 
by a series of cases that presage the movement towards it. Strauss’ account 
of the cases leading to Gideon presents this narrative of gradual common 
law change.
136
 Strauss describes the prior cases as showing the Court’s 
“experimentation” with the old rule, and, as a result of this 
experimentation, preparing the ground for the new principle. The old rule 
from Betts v. Brady held that whether counsel must be appointed in a state 
prosecution was to be decided case by case, under the Due Process Clause, 
by determining whether, under the totality of the circumstances, the failure 
to appoint counsel denied fundamental fairness.
137
 Strauss describes how 
“[i]n each case, the Court identified some occasion during the proceedings 
when the defendant might have benefited from counsel . . . .”138 In other 
words, the Court kept finding prejudice when analyzing the issue of 
whether the failure to appoint counsel had denied the defendant 
 
 
 135. Id. 
 136. David A. Strauss, Common Law Genius, supra note 92, at 868–70. 
 137. Id. at 868 (citing Betts v. Brady, 316 U.S. 455, 462, 473 (1942)). 
 138. Id. at 870. 
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“fundamental fairness.”139 As Strauss describes it, the Court eventually 
discovered through this process of experimentation that there was actually 
no instance in which the denial of counsel would not lead to a denial of 
fundamental fairness, which discovery led the Court to the black-letter rule 
in Gideon that any indigent in a state prosecution was entitled to counsel. 
Strauss’ account emphasizes that the Court eventually found the rule in 
Betts v. Brady so unworkable that it, in good common law style, fashioned 
a new rule that was. From a legal realist perspective, this is a useful 
description of the movement towards Gideon. But Gideon itself 
characterized the decision, rather, as a return to “old precedents,” and 
emphasized the grounding in original constitutional principles: “From the 
very beginning, our state and national constitutions and laws have laid 
great emphasis on procedural and substantive safeguards designed to 
assure fair trials before impartial tribunals in which every defendant stands 
equal before the law.”140 A narrative of progress regards this language as 
more than rhetorical window-dressing. A narrative of progress sees the 
case law leading to Gideon as the Court’s growing acknowledgment of the 
implicit ramifications of a constitutional principle—the right to a fair 
trial—in the context of an emerging sense of the obligations and duties of 
the modern state. 
The story of Gideon is part of the larger story of the incorporation of 
the Bill of Rights against the States through the Due Process Clause of the 
Fourteenth Amendment.
141
 By the time of Gideon, the interpretation of the 
Sixth Amendment right to counsel had already changed in the federal 
courts from being simply a negative right barring the government from 
prohibiting a defendant from obtaining representation to including the 
positive duty that the government provide counsel for indigent defendants. 
Gideon incorporated the Sixth Amendment against the States according to 
this modern understanding of the Sixth Amendment as containing a 
 
 
 139. The Congressional Research Service writes: 
Generally, the Court developed three categories of prejudicial factors . . . which required the 
furnishing of assistance of counsel. There were (1) the personal characteristics of the 
defendant which made it unlikely he could obtain an adequate defense of his own, (2) the 
technical complexity of the charges or of possible defenses to the charges, and (3) events 
occurring at trial that raised problems of prejudice. 
CONG. RESEARCH SERV., THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES: ANALYSIS AND 
INTERPRETATION 1637–38 (Centennial ed. 2013) (citing cases). 
 140. Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335, 344 (1963). 
 141. For background, see DANIEL JOHN MEADOR, PRELUDES TO GIDEON: NOTES ON APPELLATE 
ADVOCACY, HABEAS CORPUS, AND CONSTITUTIONAL LITIGATION (1967). For a contemporary 
analytical account of the Warren Court and the incorporation of the Bill of Rights, see AMAR, 
UNWRITTEN CONSTITUTION, supra note 2, 151–67. 
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positive duty. The case finding the existence of this duty in the Sixth 
Amendment for the federal courts was Johnson v. Zerbst.
142
 Johnson v. 
Zerbst itself is very brief, assuming rather than arguing this rather 
significant interpretive change. The rationale for this modern interpretation 
of the Sixth Amendment, however, was previously announced in Powell v. 
Alabama.
143
 There, Justice Sutherland stated (in language later quoted in 
Gideon), that, “[e]ven the intelligent and educated layman has small and 
sometimes no skill in the science of law.”144 And he concluded, “In a case 
such as this . . . the right to have counsel appointed, when necessary, is a 
logical corollary from the constitutional right to be heard by counsel.”145 
Yet how does one reconcile Justice Sutherland’s announcement that the 
right to have counsel appointed is a logical corollary to the Sixth 
Amendment right to counsel, when the historical record seems to indicate 
that the original intent of the Sixth Amendment was no more than a 
guarantee of the right to retain counsel? In the eighteenth century, an 
important impetus for the the Sixth Amendment right to counsel clause 
was the Founders’ rejection of the English common-law practice of 
forbidding counsel to appear for a defendant in trials for felonies.
146
 Given 
this background, the assertion of a defendant’s right to retain counsel to be 
heard in court in all criminal proceedings was an important advancement 
and one worth specifying in the Bill of Rights.
147
 A plausible originalist 
argument therefore is that the Sixth Amendment was originally understood 
as guaranteeing no more than defendant’s right to retain counsel.148 
From the framework of a narrative of progress, however, it is important 
to note that the “logical” connection that Justice Sutherland describes 
between the right to be heard by counsel and the state’s duty to provide 
counsel to the indigent defendant was already perceived by some states at 
the time of the adoption of the Sixth Amendment. Several states had 
statutes providing for the appointment of counsel for indigent defendants, 
 
 
 142. 304 U.S. 458 (1938). “It is clear that the federal courts never thought they were required by 
the Sixth Amendment to appoint counsel for indigent defendants at any time before Johnson v. Zerbst, 
in 1938.” WILLIAM M. BEANEY, THE RIGHT TO COUNSEL IN AMERICAN COURTS 77 (1955). 
 143. 287 U.S. 45 (1932); BEANEY, supra note 142, at 34–35, 151–57. 
 144. Powell, 287 U.S. at 69. 
 145. Id. at 72 (emphasis added). 
 146. BEANEY, supra note 142, at 8–12. See also Randolph N. Jonakait, The Too-Easy Historical 
Assumptions of Crawford v. Washington, 71 BROOK. L. REV. 219, 220–24 (2005) [hereinafter 
Jonakait, Historical Assumptions]. 
 147. See Randolf N. Jonakait, The Origins of the Confrontation Clause: An Alternative History, 
27 RUTGERS L.J. 77, 95–96 (1995). 
 148. BEANEY, supra note 142, at 32–33; Jonakait, Historical Assumptions, supra note 146, at 
232–33. 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_jurisprudence/vol6/iss2/2
  
 
 
 
 
2014] PUTTING PROGRESS BACK INTO PROGRESSIVE 291 
 
 
 
 
especially in the case of murder trials.
149
 The existence of these laws 
shows that some states considered that the concept of a fair trial itself 
required the appointment of counsel for indigent defendants. The point of 
these historical antecedents is that the doctrine did not emerge as a whole-
cloth creation in Powell or Johnson or Gideon. Well before these cases, 
American law felt the implicit conflict between the concept of a fair trial 
and the fact that indigent parties were not always represented by counsel. 
This conflict was recognized by the Indiana Supreme Court in Webb v. 
Baird in 1854, when that court stated that no citizen “put in jeopardy of 
life or liberty, should be debarred of counsel because he was too poor to 
employ such aid.”150 The Indiana Supreme Court pointed to the origin of 
this conflict in the court’s own sense of what was required for a fair trial: 
“[n]o Court could be respected, or respect itself, to sit and hear such a 
trial.”151 The court concluded, “The defense of the poor, in such cases, is a 
duty resting somewhere, which will be at once conceded as essential to the 
accused, to the Court, and to the public.”152 
As it turns out, although the Indiana Supreme Court found a duty of the 
state to provide for indigent defense and acknowledged that the court was 
an agent of the state that had the power to employ counsel, the Indiana 
Supreme Court could find no provision to permit payment of counsel.
153
 
Although the Webb court acknowledged the modern sense of duties of the 
welfare state, the structures of government did not yet exist to 
accommodate those duties. The fruition of this duty had to wait until the 
emergence of the modern welfare state in the twentieth century, with that 
state’s more developed structures to accommodate a correspondingly 
expanded sense of welfare responsibilities towards its citizens.
154
 
The right to counsel is therefore a particularly telling example of the 
movement from a concept of negative liberty to one of positive liberty 
within a narrative of progress based on the development of the modern 
state. In terms of the analytical distinction between negative and positive 
 
 
 149. “[F]rom the earliest period under the colonial legislatures the states have attempted through 
statutes to aid the indigent defendant by extending to him the assistance of counsel.” BEANEY, supra 
note 142, at 138. 
 150. 6 Ind. 11, 15 (Ind. 1854) (cited by Justice Black in his dissent to Betts v. Brady 316 U.S. 455, 
476–77 (1942)). 
 151. Id. 
 152. Id. (emphasis added). 
 153. Id. at 19–20. 
 154. Johnson therefore “provides a judicial parallel to the social-welfare conception of the state 
that was central to the New Deal. To put the point in language congenial to New Dealers, [Zerbst v.] 
Johnson created a system of ‘legal social security’ for federal felony defendants.” Heffernan, supra 
note 29, at 1419 (citation omitted). 
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liberty discussed above, the criminal procedure rights of the Bill of Rights 
appear to be the purest examples in the Constitution of the classic 
eighteenth century paradigm of negative freedom—the limiting of the 
power of the state over the individual. The probable original historical 
meaning of the Sixth Amendment as only guaranteeing the right to retain 
counsel fits neatly within this paradigm of negative liberty; that is, the 
Sixth Amendment limits the power of the government in its criminal 
prosecutions by granting the defendant the right to retain counsel. In 
contrast, an indigent defendant’s right to appointed counsel, as expressed 
in Powell, Johnson, and Gideon, proclaims a positive liberty, something 
that the government is required to do for the defendant.
155
 Viewed within a 
narrative of progress, however, these cases do not oppose the original 
meaning of the Sixth Amendment. They develop and augment the original 
right by articulating a duty for the welfare state to provide counsel for 
those unable to afford it. Under the modern view of freedom that develops 
along with the welfare state, formal rights are not meaningful if they 
cannot actually be exercised, and thus the state has the obligation to make 
rights meaningful by making them material.
156
 The formal right to counsel 
is not meaningful if the defendant cannot afford counsel. Powell, Johnson, 
and Gideon in effect announced the duty of the welfare state to provide the 
material support to make the right to counsel meaningful. The rule these 
cases announce can therefore be placed within a rational continuity with 
the original eighteenth-century understanding of the Sixth Amendment. 
The original formal eighteenth-century right is thus “materialized” in light 
of the development of the modern welfare state. The Sixth Amendment 
principle has not changed its core meaning, but rather has developed along 
with the duties of the modern welfare state. 
This development of the right to counsel in accordance with the 
increasing scope of the duties of the modern state correlates with the 
emergence of the Equal Protection Clause as the center of modern 
 
 
 155. Akhil Reed Amar notes that “[t]he appointment of counsel requires government to act 
‘affirmatively’ . . . .” AKHIL REED AMAR, THE CONSTITUTION AND CRIMINAL PROCEDURE: FIRST 
PRINCIPLES 140 (1997). The only other example Amar gives of such an affirmative provision is “the 
compulsory process clause, which requires government to act affirmatively to enforce subpoenas.” Id. 
Amar’s recent book, AMERICA’S UNWRITTEN CONSTITUTION, contains a number of specific analyses 
connecting key Warren Court decisions to the text and history of the Constitution. However, his 
analysis of Gideon is in terms of the rather broad constitutional principles of “symmetry” and 
“innocence protecting.” AMAR, UNWRITTEN CONSTITUTION supra note 2, at 111–12, 198. 
 156. “Materialization results from the fact ‘that legal freedom, that is, the legal permission to do as 
one pleases, is worthless without actual freedom, the real possibility of choosing between permitted 
alternatives.’ˮ HABERMAS, FACTS AND NORMS, supra note 115, at 403. 
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constitutional doctrine.
157
 For example, in the conclusion to their seminal 
article on the Equal Protection Clause, professors Joseph Tussman and 
Jacobus tenBroek discuss the emergence of modern equal protection in 
terms of the growth of government.
158
 They argue that, whereas the 
traditional American view of liberty identified liberty “with the absence of 
government,” the modern ubiquity of government has redefined the 
concept as, “[w]henever an area of activity is brought within the control or 
regulation of government to that extent equality supplants liberty as the 
dominant ideal and constitutional demand.”159 Tussman and tenBroek 
argue that this tendency is discernible “[e]ven in areas in which 
constitutional restraints have been traditionally read as prohibitions 
. . . .”160 The examples they give are of First Amendment cases that 
involve the government’s promotion of the exercise of free speech.161 But 
their analysis equally describes the development of the Sixth Amendment 
from a purely negative restriction on government power to a positive duty 
to appoint counsel for indigent defendants. 
VIII. CONCLUSION 
The preceding account has attempted to revive the Hegelian tradition of 
the narrative of progress of the modern state and apply it to contemporary 
accounts of living constitutionalism. As I have argued, this narrative of 
progress provides an explanatory framework for understanding the 
development of modern constitutional doctrine, and is congruent with 
Justice Breyer’s attempt in Active Liberty to describe the collectivist 
themes of modern constitutional doctrine. A Hegelian-inspired narrative of 
progress provides an account of how constitutional principles change by 
developing their inner-rationality over time. This narrative acknowledges 
the historical role of authorial intention, such as that of the Founders, 
while placing those historical intentions within a larger narrative of 
rational purposes made manifest over time. In drafting the Constitution, 
one might say the historical Founders captured a snapshot of certain 
 
 
 157. See Robin West, Rights, Capabilities, and the Good Society, 69 FORDHAM L. REV. 1901, 
1911 (2001) [hereinafter West, Good Society]; Robin West, The Missing Jurisprudence of the 
Legislated Constitution, in THE CONSTITUTION IN 2020, at 79–91 (Jack M. Balkin & Reva B. Siegel 
eds., 2009). 
 158. Joseph Tussman & Jacobus tenBroek, The Equal Protection of the Laws, 37 CALIF. L. REV. 
341, 380–81 (1949). 
 159. Id. at 380. 
 160. Id. 
 161. Id. 
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constitutional principles at the moment of the founding. These 
constitutional principles themselves contain an inner-rationality that works 
itself out over time, and this inner-rationality is recognized by later 
interpreters of the Constitution who interpret constitutional principles in 
light of historical developments, which themselves are framed within a 
narrative of progress. Specifically, the narrative of progress illuminates 
how constitutional principles that begin historically as limited safeguards 
of individual rights within a limited version of government divulge further 
meaning as they develop in connection with the modern welfare state. As 
an example, I have presented the development of the right to counsel for 
indigent defendants. 
Some might regard any attempt to revive a Hegelian-inspired narrative 
of progress as inevitably falling prey to the classic problem of the 
philosophy of history—viewing all history as dictated solely by the force 
of ideas, which act like agents of the omnipresent hand of God in a 
narrative of providential history. I have, however, attempted to sketch out 
an account of the movement of reason in history that does not presuppose 
the traditional theological worldview of providential history. As Habermas 
argues in Philosophical Discourse of Modernity, the relationship between 
reason and history continues to constitute the discourse of modernity of 
which we find ourselves a part.
162
 However, as Habermas further argues, 
to relate reason to history, one must carefully distinguish the meaning of 
the words “reason” and “rationality”: “[t]hey are used neither in accord 
with the game rules of ontology to characterize God or being as a whole; 
nor in accord with the game rules of empiricists to characterize individual 
subjects capable of knowledge and action.”163 Thus one must avoid two 
traditional opposite and opposing conceptions of reason. The first 
conception is that reason is a divine force set up outside human creation 
and history; the second conception is that reason is merely the subjective 
capacity of individuals.
164 
 
Following Habermas here, I would argue that the challenge for a 
contemporary revival of a narrative of progress is to navigate the opposing 
senses of these two conceptions of reason. On the one hand, a 
contemporary narrative of progress must not treat reason as something 
above and beyond human creation and history. To do so would be to revert 
to traditional providential narratives based on an external God. On the 
 
 
 162. HABERMAS, TWELVE LECTURES, supra note 57, at 392–93 n.4 (Lecture III). 
 163. Id. at 392 n.4 (Lecture III). 
 164. “Reason is valid neither as something ready-made, as an objective teleology that is 
manifested in nature or history, nor as a mere subjective faculty.” Id. 
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other hand, a contemporary narrative of progress cannot reduce reason to 
merely the local beliefs and practices of individuals at discrete historical 
moments. To do so is to fall into historicism, with a series of discrete 
historical moments each with its own discrete worldview or system of 
beliefs, but with no thread to tie those moments or beliefs together. 
A related objection is that however one attempts to define reason in 
history, any narrative of progress will artificially foist a template over 
history, both distorting the past and limiting valuable changes in the 
future. As to the issue of distorting the past by fitting it within the needs of 
the present, I would argue that this problem emerges whenever some 
continuity has to be drawn between the past and the present.
165
 
Furthermore, given the ascendence of originalism, living constitutionalism 
cannot escape addressing the issue of the continuity between modern 
constitutional doctrine and original constitutional meaning and intent. 
Because constitutional interpretation must draw some continuity between 
the past and the present, my argument is that the Hegelian-inspired 
narrative of progress provides less distortion of the past precisely because 
it acknowledges the distinctive conceptual frameworks of different 
historical periods in the course of describing the dialectical development 
of one period into another. As I have described, Hegel’s dialectical 
narrative acknowledges the distinctiveness of the modern state while 
describing the modern state’s development from the earlier stage of 
economic individualism and limited government, which are reflected in 
the institutions of civil society. 
The issue of whether a narrative of progress limits future developments 
raises a separate set of concerns. Certainly, it would be the height of hubris 
to imagine that our current conceptual schemes anticipate everything that 
might arise in the future. Indeed, rightly or wrongly, Hegel’s Philosophy 
of Right has often been criticized for announcing an end to history in his 
version of the modern state. Such criticism raises the important point that a 
theory of progress should not foreclose further beneficial change. This is 
the concern that leads Richard Rorty to, on the one hand, embrace all the 
practical developments of modernity and the modern state, while, on the 
other hand, rejecting the philosophical narrative of progress on which they 
 
 
 165. A related issue is the role of the professional historian. One view is that the historian is 
precisely supposed to recount how the past is different from the present. See HERBERT BUTTERFIELD, 
THE WHIG INTERPRETATION OF HISTORY (2d ed. 1931). As I have argued, however, constitution 
interpretation inevitably involves tracing some sort of continuity between past and present. For a 
detailed analysis of the tensions between contemporary professional historians and constitutional 
theory, see KALMAN, supra note 61. 
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have traditionally been based. Rorty argues that rejecting any 
philosophical basis for progress, including Hegel’s dialectical movement 
of the concept, can only change our account of progress for the better: 
Instead of seeing progress as a matter of getting closer to something 
specifiable in advance, we see it as a matter of solving more 
problems. Progress is . . . measured by the extent to which we have 
made ourselves better than we were in the past rather than by our 
increased proximity to a goal.
166
 
In response to Rorty’s thoughtful view, I would argue that any robust 
account of constitutional principles has the effect of both enabling and 
foreclosing change. Rorty would like to have only the enabling part and 
not the foreclosing part, but I cannot see how one can claim one aspect 
without the other.
167
 As I have described above, both conservative and 
progressive accounts of constitutional principles acknowledge this 
conclusion. Scalia’s account of constitutional principles as locking in 
rights to prevent their erosion is the clearest example of the foreclosing 
aspect of constitutional principles. But the progressive tradition also 
appeals to the stability of the rights of the past as the platform for 
expanding those rights in the future. This is reflected in Reva Siegel’s 
account of how social movements have appealed to the Constitution as a 
foundation for progress.
168
 
But if any robust account of constitutional principles has to contain 
both an enabling part and a foreclosing part, the foreclosing part in turn 
raises the “dead hand” problem, which has been central to much of the 
debate over living constitutionalism. Originalism, of course, is not 
opposed to the “dead hand” of the Constitution dictating the conduct of 
future generations. As described in Scalia’s account, the whole point of a 
written constitution is to lock in rights and prevent subsequent generations 
from violating them. Living constitutionalism, on the other hand, has 
stressed the need for the Constitution to change and adapt to the changing 
historical circumstances and needs of new generations. 
 
 
 166. RORTY, ACHIEVING OUR COUNTRY, supra note 18, at 28.  
 167. A related question is how one can have a “redemptive” account of constitutional change 
without a robust account of how constitutional principles are indeed changing for the better. Balkin 
states, “[t]oday we tell a story in which one wave of redemptive constitutionalism follows the next, but 
that is how the story looks to us today, not the way things had to be.” BALKIN, ORIGINALISM, supra 
note 62, at 76. But a narrative of progress indeed insists that the movement of constitutional principles 
has been, in some sense, the way things had to be. 
 168. For a revisiting of the issue of the importance of rights to the progressive tradition, see Robin 
West, Good Society, supra note 157. 
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I agree that living constitutionalism must validate change, but I would 
argue that such change should be seen within the framework of principles 
that come before and contain some degree of their own rational integrity. 
This is where a Hegelian-inspired narrative of progress differs in emphasis 
from an “aspirational” or “redemptive” narrative of the Constitution, 
which is a kindred form of living constitutionalism. Constitutional theorist 
Jack Balkin describes aspirational constitutionalism in terms of the 
recognition that “a constitution always exists in a fallen condition, that it 
inevitably contains compromises with evil and injustice. At the same time, 
it maintains that the constitution and the constitutional tradition contain 
elements and resources that can assist in their eventual redemption.”169 
The most obvious compromise with evil and injustice in the Constitution 
of 1789, of course, was the accommodation of slavery. But even at the 
time many saw this as an arbitrary limitation on the application of the 
principle of individual political freedom, rather than seeing the principle 
itself as inherently compromised. As discussed above, individual political 
freedom has its own “logic” as a concept distinct from its particular 
historical instantiation. So too, a logic exists in the development of the 
concept of individual freedom in relation to the development of the 
modern state. 
Finally, in seeking to place the development of the modern state at the 
center of the constitutional narrative of progress, I do not seek to dissolve 
the tension between individual liberties and the collective interests of the 
state by resolving everything in favor of the state. I am all too conscious of 
the dangers that the modern state can present to individual freedom. 
Indeed, this is the area in which the critiques of the Left have provided the 
most sophisticated insights. Originalism has nothing to say about the 
development of the modern state, and, as a consequence, cannot account 
for either its development or provide insights into the true nature of the 
dangers that the state presents to individual liberty. However, critics of 
modernity from the Left, such as Max Horkheimer and Theodore Adorno 
in The Dialectic of Enlightenment, have connected the emergence of the 
modern state to the narrative of the Enlightenment, but as a form of 
tragedy.
170
 These thinkers tell the story of Enlightenment reason beginning 
with hopes of truth and freedom and ending in the irrationality and 
 
 
 169. BALKIN, ORIGINALISM, supra note 62, at 62. 
 170. See MAX HORKHEIMER & THEODOR W. ADORNO, DIALECTIC OF ENLIGHTENMENT (John 
Cumming trans., 1986) (1944). “In the most general sense of progressive thought, the Enlightenment 
has always aimed at liberating men from fear and establishing their sovereignty. Yet the fully 
enlightened earth radiates disaster triumphant.” Id. at 3. 
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totalitarianism of the modern age.
171
 While acknowledging the importance 
of this type of powerful critique of Enlightenment reason, I believe that the 
liberal tradition of progress provides the possibility of a happy ending for 
the story of the modern state. We will never get to that happy ending, 
however, unless we at least acknowledge we are part of this story.
 
 
 171. See JÜRGEN HABERMAS, 1 THE THEORY OF COMMUNICATIVE ACTION: REASON AND THE 
RATIONALIZATION OF SOCIETY 345–99 (Thomas McCarthy trans., 1984). In a similar vein, Foucault 
describes the emergence of the modern surveillance state in MICHEL FOUCAULT, DISCIPLINE AND 
PUNISH (Alan Sheridan trans., 1995) (1977). 
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